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CELL PHONES AS TRACKING DEVICES 
M. Wesley Clark* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of the ubiquitous cell phone, law enforcement has 
been handed a priceless investigative tool without the outlay of any 
Federal funds for the hardware.  Prior to the rapid rise in cell phone use, 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), for example, would use 
traditional tracking equipment1 that it owned (or borrowed) and would 
have to surreptitiously install it, typically on or in a vehicle, aircraft, or 
boat or secreted in containers carrying precursor chemicals needed to 
manufacture controlled substances.   
The great advantages of cell phone tracking are (1) that many if not 
most adults have at least one cell phone (thus permitting the tracking of 
countless individuals as opposed to following only the travels of a much 
more limited class of conveyances2 and drums of chemicals); and (2) law 
enforcement is spared the legal and tactical hurdles that are often 
encountered when seeking to install the tracking devices.   
                                                 
*  Mr. Clark is a Senior Attorney with the Office of Chief Counsel, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, and an adjunct professor at George Mason University, teaching 
“Surveillance and Privacy in Contemporary Society.”  The views expressed herein are his 
and do not reflect the views of the DEA Office of Chief Counsel, DEA, or the Department of 
Justice.  This Article is an expansion of one appearing in the May 2006 FBI LAW 
ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, titled Cell Phone Technology and Physical Surveillance. 
1 Even government-owned tracking devices are undergoing modernization in the 21st 
century, moving from radio tracking devices to those utilizing the more precise satellite 
global positioning system (“GPS”).  GPS tracking by law enforcement has been upheld on 
the same basis as the older, more traditional, radio-based tracking equipment. See United 
States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467-68 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).  For a further discussion of 
GPS tracking, see infra note 330 and accompanying text.  Note, however, that today “the 
traditional homing devices . . . are now monitored via radio signals using the same cell 
phone towers used to transmit cell site data.”  In re the Application of the U.S.A. for an 
Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification 
System on Telephone Numbers [sealed] and [sealed] and the Production of Real Time Cell 
Site Information, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (D. Md. 2005) [hereafter DMD#1]. 
2 If the suspect leaves or changes the conveyance to which a tracking device has been 
affixed, law enforcement has lost the ability to electronically determine the surveillance 
target’s location.  Assuming the suspect has not passed off the cell phone to someone else, 
this is not the case with cell phone tracking.  Cell phone service providers whose 
instruments do not contain GPS chips were directed by the FCC to “be able to pinpoint 67 
percent of calls within 100 meters and 95 percent of calls within 300 meters.”  DMD#1, 402 
F. Supp. 2d at 599 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 2018(h)(1)(2005)). 
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Case law was supposedly well-settled after two Supreme Court cases 
decided in the 1980s, United States v. Knotts3 and United States v. Karo.4  
These cases held that so long as the conveyance or “thing” to be 
monitored is out and about on “public thoroughfares,”5 “open fields,” or 
even on private property6—all instances where the information revealed 
by the surveillance target could be observed by visual surveillance 
engaged in by third parties─no showing of any evidence, let alone 
probable cause, is required.7  This, of course, does not present a problem, 
so long as the tracking equipment belongs to the government, but it does 
present a very real issue when third-party assistance is necessary to 
conduct the monitoring.   
The rub is that cell phone companies, concerned about potential 
liability, will not furnish cell phone location information to law 
enforcement absent a court order.  The legal issue of the moment relates 
to the proper quantum of evidence that the government must 
demonstrate to a court before such an order for prospective (or real-time)8 
data will be given.   
                                                 
3 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
4 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
5 “A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another . . . .  [The subject] 
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over 
particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of 
his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.”  Knotts, 460 
U.S. at 281-82. 
6 “[N]otions of physical trespass based on the law of real property [are] not 
dispositive . . .  .”  Id. at 285. 
7 Probable cause to monitor will be required if electronic tracking is to occur within a 
private dwelling, i.e., a “location not open to visual surveillance,” or—assuming it too is 
not open to visual surveillance—its curtilage.  Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-15.  (A thorough 
discussion of “curtilage” is outside the scope of this Article.) 
8 It is submitted that for other than stored, previously-acquired cell site location data, 
“real-time” and “prospective cell site  information” are conceptually the same thing: 
permission is being sought to obtain “yet-to-be” information that is to be acquired/become 
available during a span of time that is to occur after an authorizing court order would be 
signed.  However, one court has suggested that the two terms can mean different things: 
Real time cell site information is a subset of “prospective” cell site 
information, which refers to all cell site information that is generated 
after the government has received court permission to acquire it.  
Records stored by the wireless provider that detail the location of a cell 
phone in the past (i.e.: prior to entry of the court order authorizing 
government acquisition) are known as “historical” cell site 
information. 
DMD#1, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 2005). 
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In a 2004 cell phone tracking case, United States v. Forest,9 DEA 
already had authority to intercept wire communications pursuant to 
Title III10 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522).  Additionally, the Title III order 
directed the provider “to disclose to the government all subscriber 
information, toll records, and other information relevant to the 
government’s investigation.”11  As an aid to the establishment of visual 
contact with the subject, DEA dialed the target’s cell phone (without 
letting it ring) several times in the course of the day and would then 
obtain the cell phone location information from the service provider.12   
Among other things, the defendant argued that in so doing, DEA 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  Of course the threshold question 
was whether or not securing the cell site location information constituted 
either a search or a seizure.  For that to be the case, there must have first 
been a “subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as 
reasonable”; but that was not the situation in Forest because the data 
“was used to track [the target’s] movements only on public highways.”13  
The Sixth Circuit thus concluded that Knotts was controlling and that 
there was “no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell-site data 
because the DEA agents could have obtained the same information by 
following [the target’s] car.”14   
But in most location surveillance scenarios, law enforcement will 
probably not be fortunate enough to have a Title III order up and 
running, like in Forest, thus presenting the need for a stand-alone order.  
To obtain such court authorization, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
has been using selected provisions from Title II of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”),15 primarily 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 
                                                 
9 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), cert denied, 543 U.S. 856 (2004). 
10 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 
Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)). 
11 Forest, 355 F.3d at 947. 
12 DEA used the carrier’s “computer data to determine which cellular transmission 
towers were being ‘hit’ by [the target’s] phone.  This ‘cell-site data’ revealed the general 
location of [the target].”  Id. 
13 Id. at 950-51. 
14 Id. at 951.  “Although the DEA agents were not able to maintain visual contact with 
[the target’s] car at all times, visual observation was possible by any member of the public.  
The DEA simply used the cell-site data to ‘augment[ ] the sensory faculties bestowed upon 
them at birth,’ which is permissible under Knotts . . . .  [T]he cell site data is simply a proxy 
for [the target’s] visually observable location.”  Id. 
15 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860 (2000).  Note that 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (Title 
II of the ECPA, as amended) is sometimes informally referred to as the Stored 
Communications Act or SCA, even though it is not denominated as such within the body 
of the ECPA. 
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either alone or in combination with the pen register/trap and trace 
statute (“Pen/Trap Statute”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.16   
This has not proved to be a winning strategy, however, and DOJ is 
(depending upon how one keeps score and as of this writing) 0-17-5 or 5-
17 in a series of late 2005-early 2007 federal cases before twelve United 
States Magistrate Judges (“USMJs”) and five District Court Judges in 
twelve different judicial districts (California; two in Indiana; Louisiana; 
Maryland; three in New York; Texas; Washington, D.C.; Wisconsin; and 
West Virginia).17  In the course of their decisions, most of the courts 
                                                 
16 Prior to passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. 
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 212 (2001), “pen register” was defined as a “device which records or 
decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise 
transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached[.]”  Before the advent of 
cell phones (at a time when telephones were connected by copper wires), a pen register was 
actually a machine that printed onto a roll of paper all number dialed from the targeted 
phone.  It would also print the times that the telephone receiver was picked up (“off hook”) 
and when it was replaced (“on hook”).  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979).  
Today most of the data that the machines used to acquire and print out are collected and 
arranged by service provider computer feeds and software.  “[I]nformation that was 
heretofore captured by a pen register can now be transmitted digitally by the telephone 
service provider.”  In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order for Disclosure of 
Telecommunications Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and 
Trace Device, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter SDNY#1].  In 
recognition of this technology shift, § 216 of the USA PATRIOT Act updated the pen 
register definition (and, relatedly, that of the trap and trace “device” as well) so that 
§ 3127(3) now describes a pen register as “a device or process which records or decodes 
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or 
facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted[.]”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3127(3) (2000 & Supp. IV 2005). 
17 In addition to DMD#1, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 2005), and SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 
2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), these are: In re an Application of U.S.A. for an Order (1) 
Authorizing the use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing 
Release of Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Information, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter EDNY #1], on reconsideration, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294 [hereinafter 
EDNY #2]; In re the Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site 
Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005) [hereinafter SDTX#1]; In re the 
Applications of U.S.A. for Orders Authorizing the Disclosure of Cell Cite Information, Nos. 
05-403, 05-404, 05-407, 05-408, 05-409, 05-410, 05-411, 2005 WL 3658531 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 
2005) [hereinafter DDC#1]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the 
Release of Prospective Cell Site Information, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2005) [hereinafter 
DDC#2]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the Release of 
Prospective Cell Site Information, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2006) [hereinafter DDC#3]; 
In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell 
Site Information, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 2006) [hereinafter EDWIS#1]; In re the 
Application of U.S.A. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen 
Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information 
and/or Cell Site Information, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006) [hereinafter WDLA]; In re 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 2
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concluded that an order based upon probable cause and grounded upon 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (“Rule 41”) is required to compel 
cell phone providers to divulge real-time/prospective cell site location 
information.18   
                                                                                                             
the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen 
Register and/or Trap and Trace for Mobile Identification Number (585) 111-1111 and the 
Disclosure of Subscriber and Activity Information Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, 415 F. Supp. 2d 
211 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter WDNY]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register with Caller Identification Device and 
Cell Site Location Authority on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663 (S.D. W. 
Va. 2006) [hereinafter SDWVA]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for Orders Authorizing the 
Installation and Use of Pen Registers and Caller Identification Devices on Telephone 
Numbers [Sealed] and [Sealed], 416 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md. 2006) [hereinafter DMD#2]; In 
re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Information on 
a Certain Cellular Telephone, No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 01, 2006 WL 468300 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 
2006) [hereinafter SDNY#2]; In re the Application for an Order Authorizing the Installation 
and Use of a Pen Register Device, Trap and Trace Device, Dialed Number Interceptor, 
Number Search Device, and Caller Identification Service, and the Disclosure of Billing, 
Subscriber, and Air Time Information, No.S-06-SW-0041 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2006) 
[hereinafter EDCA]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the 
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing 
Release of Subscriber and Other Information, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804 (S.D. Tex. 2006) 
[hereinafter SDTX#2]; United States v. Bermudez, No. IP 05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181 
(S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006) [hereinafter SDIND]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order: 
(1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) 
Authorizing the Release of Subscriber and Other Information; and (3) Authorizing the 
Disclosure of Location-Based Services; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order: (1) 
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) 
Authorizing the Release of Subscriber and Other Information; and (3) Location of Cell Site 
Origination and/or Termination, Nos. 1:06-MC-6, 1:06-MC-7, 2006 WL 1876847 (N.D. Ind. 
July 5, 2006) [hereinafter NDIND]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing 
(1) Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device or Process, (2) Access 
to Customer Records, and (3) Cell Phone Tracking, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Tex. 2006) 
[hereinafter SDTX#3]; In re the Application for an Order Authorizing the Installation and 
Use of a Pen Register and Directing the Disclosure of Telecommunications Records for the 
Cellular Phone Assigned the Number [SEALED], 439 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D. Md. 2006) 
[hereinafter DMD#3]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the 
Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Information, No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743 (E.D. 
Wis. Oct. 6, 2006) [hereinafter EDWIS#2]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order for 
Prospective Cell Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 
448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter SDNY#3]; In re Application for an Order Authorizing the 
Extension and Use of a Pen Register Device, No. 07-SW-034 GGH, 2007 WL 397129 (E.D. 
Cal. Feb. 1, 2007) [hereinafter EDCA#2]. 
18 This is not to conclude that legal underpinnings other than 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703 and 
§§ 3121-3127 or FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 are not available upon which to ground an application 
for an order compelling a cell phone service provider to provide real-time/prospective cell 
site location information.  See discussion infra note 99; infra Part III.A (Alternative Legal 
Foundation). 
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II.  BACKGROUND AND CASES 
A. Eastern District of New York—August and October, 2005 
(EDNY#1/EDNY#2)   
Underpinning its application with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1)(B), (c)(2), 
and (d), the U.S. Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) sought an order compelling 
the “disclosure of the location of cell site/sector (physical address) at call 
origination (for outbound calling), call termination (for incoming calls), 
and if reasonably available, during the progress of a call, for the Subject 
Telephone.”19  Of these three subsections,20 the USMJ found that only 
one, § 2703(d), might provide a basis for the order sought.  An order 
pursuant to that provision can be had upon a showing of “specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or 
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”21   
The USMJ concluded that the government had provided the 
requisite level of evidence called for by § 2703(d) and that under the 
statutory definition,22 cell site location information would, in fact, 
constitute the “contents of . . . [an] electronic communication” except for 
one thing:  the definition of “electronic communication”23 specifically 
excludes “any communication from a tracking device,”24 the latter term 
being defined at 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) as “an electronic or mechanical 
device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or 
                                                 
19 EDNY#1, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 563. 
20 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B) provides that the government may require “[a] provider of 
electronic communication service or remote computing service [to] disclose a record or 
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . [when the 
Government obtains a court order pursuant to § 2703(d)].”  An “electronic communication 
service,” the term relevant for our purposes, is “any service which provides to users thereof 
the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications[.]”  Id. § 2510(15).  Cell 
phone calls are a type of “wire communication.”  Section 2703(c)(2) provides that electronic 
communications services and remote computing services “shall disclose to a governmental 
entity the—(A)  name; (B) address; (C) local and long distance telephone connection 
records, or records of session times and durations; (D) length of service (including start 
date) and types of service utilized; (E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber 
number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and (F) means 
and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account 
number)” if the government obtains, inter alia, an order pursuant to § 2703(d). 
21 Id. § 2703(d). 
22 See id. § 2510(12) (defining electronic communication by operation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2711(1)). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. § 2510(12)(C). 
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object.”  The USMJ determined that based upon the statutory definitions, 
the targeted cell phone equated to—and was thus “precisely describe[d]” 
as—a tracking device.  Thus the court felt it was constrained from 
granting the government’s application for a tracking order to the extent 
the pleading was based upon 18 U.S.C. § 2703.   
Because the government’s application also sought permission to 
conduct pen register as well as trap and trace operations, the court felt 
that “[i]n fairness . . . [it] must also consider whether the relief is 
available simply by virtue of the government’s otherwise proper 
application . . . ” for this additional authority.25  The USMJ concluded the 
Pen/Trap statute did not provide such a basis because specific language 
in the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
(“CALEA”)26 precluded it.  Among other things, CALEA mandated that 
telecommunications carriers be technologically able to 
expeditiously isolat[e] and enabl[e] the government, 
pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, 
to access call-identifying information . . . except that, 
with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to 
the authority for pen registers and trap and trace 
devices . . . , such call-identifying information shall not 
include any information that may disclose the physical 
location of the subscriber . . . .27   
Distilling matters, the USMJ opined that “where a carrier’s assistance 
to law enforcement is ordered on the basis of something less than 
probable cause, such assistance must not include disclosure of a 
subscriber’s physical location.”28  Upon reconsideration, the USMJ again 
                                                 
25 EDNY#1, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).  It should be kept in mind that the 
government never grounded its request for cell site location information upon 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3121-3127.  Note that after EDNY#1, but before EDNY#2, SDTX#1 was issued.  The 
USMJ who decided EDNY #1 and EDNY#2 “. . . considered precisely the same statutes and 
legislative history as [did the SDTX#1 USMJ] (and apparently many of the same 
arguments), and . . . independently arrived at the same conclusions as did he.”  EDNY#2, 
396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
26 Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 103, 108 Stat. 4279, 4280-81 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(a)(2)(B) (2000)). 
27 47 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a)(2)(B). 
28 EDNY#1, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 565.  To the extent the government seeks a cell phone 
user’s location based upon the Pen/Trap Statute, this is correct.  However, and despite the 
USMJ’s discussion in EDNY#2, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 325-26, a strong argument exists that 
such information can be obtained from carriers based upon a less than probable cause 
order issued pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).  
18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) states in pertinent part that “. . . a court is empowered to issue a warrant 
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Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1420 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
denied the government’s request for real-time cell site location 
information again concluding that the existing law did not allow the 
government to obtain the information “on a prospective, real-time basis 
without a showing of probable cause.”29   
B. Southern District of Texas—October 2005 (SDTX#1)   
In the Texas case, the government specifically combined a pen/trap 
request with one seeking subscriber records—as the latter term is 
described at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2).  The application also sought, in part, 
the prospective/real-time “location30 of cell site/sector (physical 
address) at call origination (for outbound calling), call termination (for 
incoming calls), and, if reasonably available, during the progress of a 
call.”31  In addition to this, however, the request also asked for more than 
had been requested in the EDNY #1 application:  “information regarding 
the strength, angle, and timing of the caller’s signal measured at two or 
more cell sites, as well as other system information such as a listing of all 
cell towers in the market area, switching technology, protocols, and 
network architecture.”32  As a result, the question that the USMJ found 
himself faced with was whether “this location information [is] merely 
another form of subscriber record accessible upon a showing of ‘specific 
and articulable facts’ under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), as the government 
contends[,] . . . [or whether] this type of surveillance require[s] a more 
exacting standard, such as probable cause under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41[.]”33   
                                                                                                             
or other order for the installation of a mobile tracking device[.]” (emphasis added).  Note that 
although the government invoked both the Pen/Trap Statute and 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), it 
“identifies no other method for its agents to obtain the information it seeks[.]”  EDNY#1, 
384 F. Supp. 2d at 566. 
29 EDNY#2, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 295.  Note that upon his reconsideration, which included 
a second, perhaps closer look at the government’s proposed applications and orders, the 
USMJ changed his earlier conclusion—which was that the government was asking the cell 
phone carrier to surrender cell site location information—to one that construed the 
government’s request to be one seeking authority to use a pen register to acquire the data 
“and not through any actual disclosure from a provider of electronic communications 
service[,]” but this was not significant because “Congress plainly intended the ‘location’ 
prohibition in CALEA to regulate not only what a carrier can provide, but also what law 
enforcement can lawfully ‘obtain.’”  Id. at 307 n.9. 
30 At an earlier time, the court appears to have granted a government application for 
historical cell site data.  SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2005).  For a 
description of the interaction between cell phones and cell phone towers, see id. at 750. 
31 Id. at 749.  This is exactly the same language used in the EDNY#1 application. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 749-50. 
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At the end of the day, the court in SDTX#1 came to the same 
conclusion as the USMJ in EDNY#1 and EDNY#2 and rejected all of the 
government’s theories—Pen/Trap, Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”),34 and the hybrid mix of the two.35  The USMJ ended his opinion 
by observing that “[d]enial of the government’s request for prospective 
cell site data in this instance should have no dire consequences for law 
enforcement.  This type of surveillance is unquestionably available upon 
a traditional probable cause showing under Rule 41.”36   
C. District of Maryland—November 2005 (DMD#1)   
In the Maryland case, the government again raised its combined 
Pen/Trap-SCA hybrid theory and suffered the same result:  “[The first 
two USMJs] reject[ed] this ‘hybrid theory’ under almost identical 
rationales. . . .  This court joins them.”37  Although the outcome for the 
government was the same as in the earlier USMJ opinions, the court here 
at least helpfully recognized, but to no effect, that if obtaining real time 
cell site information is the same as obtaining a tracking device, then the 
government is likely not “constitutionally required to obtain a warrant” 
so long as the phone is in a public place and visual surveillance is 
possible.38  This was because in the final analysis, 
The court will not enter an order authorizing disclosure 
of real time cell site information under authority other 
than Rule 41, nor upon a showing of less than probable 
cause.  To the extent the government seeks to act 
without a warrant, the government acts at its peril, as it 
                                                 
34 See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
35 The government’s “hybrid” theory is explained well by the court in SDTX#1, 396 F. 
Supp. 2d at 761.  Summarizing, this construct approach proceeds from the realization that 
CALEA precluded use “solely” of the Pen/Trap Statute to obtain prospective/real-time cell 
site location information, 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2), thus necessitating the conjunctive use of at 
least one more statute, i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), which permits acquisition of non-content 
subscriber information, such as—arguably—cell site location information. 
By mixing and matching statutory provisions in this manner, the 
government concludes that cell site data enjoys a unique status under 
electronic surveillance law—a new form of electronic surveillance 
combining the advantages of the pen/trap law and the SCA (real-time 
location tracking based on less than probable cause) without their 
respective limitations. 
SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761. 
36 SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 765. 
37 DMD#1, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (D. Md. 2005). 
38 Id. at 604. 
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may not monitor an electronic tracking device in a 
private place without a warrant.39   
D. District of the District of Columbia—October and December 2005; January 
2006 (DDC#1/DDC#2/DDC#3)   
Facing the SDTX#1 and both EDNY decisions, the government 
unsuccessfully tried in DDC#1 to marry the SCA with the Pen/Trap 
statute.  However, this approach suffered the same fate as it had in the 
earlier Texas and New York decisions.  The mixture of the SCA and the 
Pen/Trap statute, wrote the USMJ, “has been rejected by two courts for 
reasons which . . . [this court] finds compelling. . . .  [This court has] 
determined that the disclosure of cell cite [sic] information is not 
authorized by Section 2703, by Sections 3122 and 3123, or by any 
combination of the two provisions.”40  The deciding USMJ went on to 
state that two other USMJs in the district, including USMJ Facciola, the 
author of DDC#2 and DDC#3, shared the same views.41  Also 
recognizing the SDTX#1 and EDNY opinions, but not necessarily 
conceding their “validity,” the government in DDC#2 attempted an 
unholy union of the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)42 and 
sought to “demonstrat[e] probable cause to believe that the requested 
prospective cell cite [sic] information is relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.”43  More specifically, the USMJ in 
DDC#2 found that this formulation was “tautological,” and, in the 
court’s analogy, that the attempt was akin to designing a horse by a 
committee and instead constructing a camel.44  The court determined 
that “the probable cause showing does not meet the central problem 
identified in the [SDTX#1 and EDNY] cases, that the statutes upon which 
the government purports to rely in those cases and in this one, i.e., 18 
                                                 
39 Id. at 605.  This, of course, is no different from the risk the government regularly and 
as a matter of practice assumes when using traditional or GPS tracking devices. 
40 DDC#1, Nos. 05-403, 05-404, 05-407, 05-408, 05-409, 05-410, 05-411, 2005 WL 3658531, 
at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005). 
41 Id.  Curiously, neither the DDC#2 nor the DDC#3 opinion, each written by USMJ 
Facciola, referred to DDC#1. 
42 The court appears to incorrectly see this as a somewhat bizarre blending of the Fourth 
Amendment with the standard articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2), the Pen/Trap Statute.  
However, whereas 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), part of the SCA, mandates that applicants “offer[ ] 
specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the . . . records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation[,]” § 3122(b)(2) requires only that an applicant certify to the court 
that pen/trap information “is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation[.]”  DDC#2, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2005). 
43 DDC#2, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 132-33. 
44 Id. at 133. 
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U.S.C. §§ 3122, 3123, 2703(c)(1) do not authorize the government to 
secure cell site data that would disclose the location of the person using 
the cell phone.”45   
A month later (DDC#3), the government returned to the same USMJ 
as in DDC#2 without replacing the hybrid approach, still championing 
the Pen/Trap Statute in combination with the SCA.  To buttress its 
application, the government also submitted a supporting, self-styled 
affidavit prepared by the investigating agent but, in the court’s words, 
this did nothing but “put[ ] us back to where we started.”46  Referring to 
and following the ultimate conclusions already reached by the USMJs in 
Texas, New York, and Maryland, the court opined that “the standard 
that pertains to the issuance [of an order seeking prospective cell site 
location information] is, as the Fourth Amendment requires, probable 
cause to believe that the information sought is itself evidence of a crime, 
not that the information is relevant to an investigation.”47  Further, the 
government’s proffer of “‘probable cause to show relevance to an 
ongoing investigation’” is “an ersatz standard[.]”48   
One of the most important matters CALEA addressed was law 
enforcement’s continued access to the fast changing telecommunications 
infrastructure for the purpose of conducting lawful electronic 
surveillance.  With the emergence of wireless technology, law 
enforcement did not want to be in a worse situation when attempting to 
engage in such surveillance than it was when telephony was 
accomplished only through copper wires.49  Providers were thus 
required by CALEA to ensure that their deploying technologies would 
permit the same electronic surveillance access as before while at the 
same time ensuring continuing safeguards against unwarranted privacy 
intrusions by law enforcement under 47 U.S.C. § 1002.   
Passage of the legislation, which guaranteed continued access by law 
enforcement—given the advent of wireless technologies—to call-
identifying information via pen registers, was ensured by inserting the 
                                                 
45 Id. 
46 DDC#3, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 (D.D.C. 2006). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 “The purpose of . . . [CALEA] is to preserve the government’s ability, pursuant to 
court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept communications involving advanced 
technologies such as digital or wireless transmission modes . . . while protecting the 
privacy of communications and without impeding the introduction of new technologies, 
features, and services.”  H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 9 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3489. 
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restriction that in no event could such data “include any information that 
may disclose the physical location of the subscriber[.]”50  During 
consideration of the bill which became CALEA,51 the Congressional 
testimony of (then) FBI Director Louis Freeh, which endorsed this 
restriction, was influential in securing passage.52  The USMJ found 
Director Freeh’s statement compelling:   
The Director’s offer and its acceptance by Congress led 
to the exception codified as 47 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(a)(2) . . .  [T]he exception was based on the 
express representation by the government to Congress 
that the authority for pen registers and trap and trace 
devices would not and could not be used to secure 
location information, the very information the 
government now wants to secure by using a pen register 
and trap and trace device.53   
Not only was the USMJ unconvinced that the Pen/Trap Statute 
provided a legal basis for acquiring cell site location information, he was 
similarly unpersuaded that “Congress intended to permit the 
government to use the Pen Register Statute to avail itself of that 
technology [to ascertain the location of a person using a cell phone], 
provided it combined its use . . . with some other means[,]” e.g., the SCA.  
Such a conclusion, continued the USMJ, was  
utterly counter-intuitive . . . .  It is inconceivable to [the 
USMJ] that the Congress that precluded the use of the 
Pen Register statute to secure in 1994 ‘transactional 
data’ . . . nevertheless intended to permit the 
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 H.R. 4922, 103d Cong. (1994).  “The FBI Director testified that the legislation was 
intended to preserve the status quo, that it was intended to provide law enforcement no 
more and no less access to information than it had in the past.”  H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 
22, as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3502. 
52 The testimony continued, 
Therefore, H.R. 4922 includes provisions, which FBI Director Freeh 
supported in his testimony, that add protections to the exercise of the 
government’s current surveillance authority.  Specifically, the 
bill: . . . expressly provides that the authority for pen registers and trap 
and trace devices cannot be used to obtain tracking or location 
information . . . . Currently, in some cellular systems, transactional 
data that could be obtained by a pen register may include location 
information. 
H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 17, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3497. 
53 DDC#3, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 138 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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government to use that same statute, whether by itself or 
combined with some other means, to secure the 
infinitely more intrusive information about the location 
of a cell phone every minute of every day that the cell 
phone was on.54   
E. Southern District of New York—December 2005 (SDNY#1)   
Although the first Southern District of New York decision could be 
viewed as a government victory, that success is somewhat illusory 
because the location information sought here was relatively imprecise 
(hence less intrusive or invasive) when compared to the more focused 
data at issue in the cases already discussed.  This distinction is key and 
was both recognized and explored not only by the USMJ in SDNY#1 but 
also later by the USMJ in DDC#3.  The SDNY#1 USMJ granted the 
government’s application seeking “information pertaining to the location 
of cell site towers receiving a signal from a particular cellular telephone,” 
i.e., “cell site activations,”55 and requesting that the cell phone company 
provide a map detailing the locations of its cell towers, i.e., their 
“‘locations/addresses, sectors and orientations[,]’” to include “‘the 
physical address/location of all cellular towers in the specified 
market.’”56  As might be expected given the differing call volumes, there 
are more towers in a particular urban area than would be present in a 
rural area of the same size.  This means that the towers will be closer to 
each other in the city than in outlying areas.  As a rule, therefore, an 
operating cell phone’s location can be determined with more precision 
when the towers in communication with the mobile phone are closer 
together.   
                                                 
54 Id. at 140.  The USMJ explains that ascertaining the location of one’s cell phone (and 
thus the user) is more “intrusive” than obtaining the information a pen register was 
originally intended to secure—the numbers dialed from one’s phone.  Id. 
55 SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  “Cell site activations” refers to 
“‘cell-site information concerning the physical location of the antenna towers associated 
with the beginning and termination of calls to and from a particular cellphone,’” i.e., but 
not during the course of the call.  Id. at 437 (citations omitted). 
56 Id. 
With respect to the beginning or end of the call (and possibly 
sometimes in between), there is a listing [provided by the carrier] of a 
three-digit number assigned to a cellphone tower or base station.  At 
least one cellular provider will give, in addition to the number of the 
tower, a digit (‘1,’ ‘2’ or ‘3’) indicating a 120 degree ‘face’ of the tower 
towards which the cell phone is signaling. 
Id. 
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The SDNY#1 USMJ took great pains to distinguish the less exact 
types of information being sought in the case before him from those at 
issue before the USMJs in the SDTX#1, EDNY, and DMD#1 cases:   
First, the cell site information provided in this District is 
tied only to telephone calls actually made or received by 
the telephone user.  Thus, no data is provided as to the 
location of the cell phone when no call is in progress.  
Second, at any given moment, data is provided only as 
to a single cell tower with which the cell phone is 
communicating.  Thus, no data is provided that could be 
‘triangulated’ to permit the precise location of the cell 
phone user.  Third, the data is not obtained by the 
Government directly [from the user’s phone] but is 
instead transmitted from the provider digitally to a 
computer maintained by the Government.57 
The government again relied upon the Pen/Trap Statute and 18 
U.S.C. § 2703.  Echoing observations announced in the earlier cell phone 
tracking decisions, the court said that “the Pen Register Statute would by 
itself provide authority for the order being sought by the Government 
were it not for [47 U.S.C. § 1002].”58  Not conceding that all was thereby 
necessarily lost, the court seized upon that portion of 47 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(a)(2) which provides that subscriber physical location information 
may not be acquired “‘solely’ pursuant” to the Pen/Trap Statute.  
Referring to a dictionary for guidance, the USMJ reasoned that “[i]f we 
are told that an act is not done ‘solely’ pursuant to some authority, it can 
only mean that the act is done pursuant to that authority 
‘with . . . another’ authority . . . albeit in some unspecified way . . . to 
authorize disclosure of cell site information.”59   
The upshot of all of this is that there is “‘simply impose[d] upon law 
enforcement an authorization requirement different from that minimally 
necessary for use of pen registers and trap and trace devices.’”60  
Although attempting to determine what, exactly, constitutes an 
                                                 
57 Id. at 438 (explanation provided).  The government computer uses software to render 
meaningful the raw data pushed to it by the service provider.  Id.  This distinction drawn 
by the USMJ with regard to the degree of precision or quality of sought-after cell phone 
location information strikes one as being akin to the old saw about “being a little bit 
pregnant.” 
58 Id. at 440. 
59 Id. at 442 (internal citations omitted). 
60 Id. at 443 (internal citations omitted). 
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appropriate “unspecified way” is “certainly an unattractive choice,”61 the 
court admitted, it nevertheless began an examination of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(c)—as urged by the government—in an effort to see whether that 
provision would qualify.  Recall that 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) states an order 
pursuant to § 2703(c) may be had upon a government demonstration of 
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the 
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.” 62  We know from § 2703(c) that a “record or 
other information” is that which “pertain[s] to a subscriber to or 
customer of” the communication service.  Analyzing the nature of cell 
phone location information, the USMJ concluded that “cell site or 
tracking information comes within section 2703(c) and consequently is 
the sort of ‘information’ that the Government may seek pursuant to an 
order under section 2703(d).”63   
In a friend of the court brief filed in the case, the Federal Defenders 
of New York, Inc., argued that such a § 2703(d) order could not properly 
issue because the statutory definition of “electronic communication” 
specifically excludes “any communication from a tracking device.”64  
This is the same argument which the EDNY USMJ found sufficiently 
compelling to be determinative.65  But the SDNY#1 USMJ deflected that 
contention first by recognizing that a cell phone user is a consumer of 
“electronic communication service”; and, second, by acknowledging that 
such service includes a number of capabilities, i.e., a package that is more 
than just cell site information (hence, “electronic communication service” 
cannot be the equivalent of cell phone location information).  “Inasmuch 
as a service that provides cellular telephone capabilities is within section 
                                                 
61 Id. 
62 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2000) (emphasis added). 
63 SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 445. 
64 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) defines “electronic communication” as 
any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, 
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that 
affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include . . . any 
communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of 
this title). 
Observe that 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) incorporates the definitions set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 for 
purposes of §§ 2701-2712. 
65 See supra Part II.A (discussing EDNY#1 and EDNY#2). 
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2510(15),66 information pertaining to a subscriber of that ‘service’ is 
obtainable under section 2703(c).”67   
In other words, information on the location of cell 
towers is not the ‘service’ to which a cellular customer 
subscribes.  Instead, the user subscribes to the voice—
and perhaps data-transmission capabilities provided by 
the cellular carrier.  Although tower location 
information may be a necessary ingredient for the 
operation of that service, the ‘service’ to which the user 
subscribes is still the ‘electronic communication’ 
capabilities of the cellular telephone . . . .  The exception 
in section 2510(12)(C) [“communication from a tracking 
device”] does not purport to limit the meaning of the 
term ‘information.’68   
The next stumbling block to confront the USMJ was whether § 2703 
could be used as a basis for acquiring information created in the future.  
The New York Federal Defenders and the earlier USMJs 
“question[ed] . . . whether cell site information not yet in existence at the 
time of the order—that is, prospective or what is colloquially referred to 
as ‘real time’ data—may be included . . . .”69  Indeed, chapter 121 of U.S. 
Code Title 18, of which § 2703 is a part, is captioned “Stored Wire and 
Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access,”70 thus 
suggesting that its provisions relate to already acquired or historical 
data.  The USMJ put aside this concern for the moment, remarking in 
part that—at least in his district—cell site location information “is 
transmitted to the government only after it has come into the possession 
of the cellular telephone provider in the form of a record.”71   
                                                 
66 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) defines “electronic communication service” to be “any service 
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic 
communications.” 
67 SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 446. 
68 Id. (citations omitted).  Appreciating the mental gymnastics involved in its argument, 
the court conceded that “[i]t may seem anomalous that the Government may obtain under 
section 2703 a particular category of information pertaining to a user of electronic 
communications that is excepted from the term electronic communications itself.”  Id. 
69 Id. 
70 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2000) (emphasis added). 
71 SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 447.  This remark at least suggests the possibility that in 
districts elsewhere, cell phone location information can be provided simultaneously to both 
the provider and law enforcement.  For a relatively recent state opinion permitting the 
acquisition of historical cell site location information, see People v. Hall, 823 N.Y.S.2d 334 
(Sup. Ct. 2006).  The court determined that a cell phone could be considered to be a 
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However, some of the other USMJs and the New York Federal 
Defenders argued that even this being so, the government was not 
entitled to a “continuing order for the cell phone company to provide 
stored records in the future.”72  Indeed, whereas two statutes permitting 
electronic surveillance (“ELSUR”) to occur for a period of time 
subsequent to the execution of an authorizing order by a judicial officer, 
Title III and the Pen/Trap Statute, both contain time limits beyond which 
such surveillance cannot continue.73  Section 2703 does not, thus strongly 
suggesting that it cannot rationally be viewed as a valid legal basis for 
“real time” ELSUR in the form of cell phone tracking.  An exercise in 
comparing and contrasting is useful, conceded the USMJ, but only “as an 
effort to determine whether Congress ‘intended’ section 2703 to cover 
prospective cell site data.”74  Such intent is of no import, continued the 
court, because the “heart of the statute-granting authority [of § 2703] to 
obtain ‘information’ about cell phone customers—does not on its face 
contain any limitation regarding when such information may come into 
being.”75  In any event, the USMJ said, the government could get around 
this issue by submitting a request to the cell phone provider every hour 
(or more often) for “historical” records.  “Thus, as a theoretical matter, 
the statute permits the Government to obtain cell site data on a 
continuing or ongoing basis even under a narrow reading of section 
2703.”76   
Combining the Pen/Trap Statute with § 2703 makes eminent sense, 
the USMJ opined, because such a construct will contain the ELSUR time 
limitation that § 2703, by itself, lacks and because such a hybrid will 
avoid the difficulty foreseen—assuming just for the moment that the 
Pen/Trap Statute could be used alone—that it provides but a minimal 
proof standard (a mere certification of “relevance”)77 whereas § 2703 
requires a higher evidentiary threshold, that of “specific and articulable 
facts” showing “reasonable grounds” exist to demonstrate that the 
                                                                                                             
“portion of a tracking device” only if the phone were on and it were “pinged” by the 
service provider.  Id. at 338. 
72 SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 447. 
73 Although extensions are permitted for cause shown, an initial court-ordered Title III 
has a duration of 30 days, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5), and pens/traps can initially extend for up to 
60 days, 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (c). 
74 SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 447. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2). 
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requested information will prove “relevant and material” to the 
government’s investigation.78   
A stricter Fourth Amendment standard is not required, reasoned the 
court, because in the facts before it, the degree of location information 
sought was not pinpoint accuracy and thus was insufficiently precise to 
determine a person’s situs inside a building.  “These towers can be up to 
10 or more miles apart in rural areas and may be up to a half-mile or 
more apart in urban areas.  Moreover, the data is provided only in the 
event the user happens to make or receive a telephone call.”79  
Additionally, the cell phone customer, by use of the cell phone, of 
necessity communicates information to a third party—the carrier.  The 
Supreme Court has already instructed that such communication to a 
third party removes any possible privacy interest from the Fourth 
Amendment’s ambit.80   
By way of conclusion, the USMJ observed that because technology is 
changing rapidly, any cell site information order that it may issue in the 
future will set out with particularity what data that cell phone service 
companies may provide (and no other).  This will be:   
(1) information regarding cell site location that consists 
of the tower receiving transmissions from the target 
phone (and any information on what portion of that 
tower is receiving a transmission, if available); (2) tower 
information that is tied to a particular telephone call 
made or received by the user; and (3) information that is 
transmitted from the provider to the government.81   
F. Eastern District of Wisconsin—January 2006 (EDWIS)   
In the Eastern District of Wisconsin case, based upon both the 
Pen/Trap Statute and 18 U.S.C. § 2703, the hybrid theory, the 
government sought an order directing the carrier to provide for a 60-day 
period subsequent to the date of any order:   
a. Originating and terminating cellular tower and 
sector information for all calls to and from [the target] 
cellular telephone (i.e., cell site activations);  
                                                 
78 Id. § 2703(d). 
79 SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
80 Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)). 
81 Id. at 450. 
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b. Map of cellular tower locations/addresses, sectors 
and orientations; and 
c. The physical address/location of all cellular towers 
in the applicable markets.82   
Aware of the SDTX#1, EDNY, DMD#1, DDC#3, and SDNY#1 
decisions, the USMJ—troubled by the government’s request for 
prospective (as opposed to historical) information—denied the 
application.  The court did concede that the information here requested 
by the government was less invasive than that sought in SDTX#1 and 
EDNY and, in fact, it was on par with that desired in SDNY#1.  
However, at the end of the day the USMJ could find no lasting virtue in 
the hybrid theory.  Although it independently conducted its own legal 
analysis, the USMJ ultimately parted ways with the SDNY#1 decision 
and found the DDC#3 analysis to be the more compelling.   
But the USMJ agreed with the SDNY#1 USMJ to the extent the latter 
concluded that “cell site data, i.e., information on the location of cell site 
towers used by a cellular telephone, is included in the term ‘signaling 
information’ for purposes of the Pen/Trap Statute.”83  However, the 
CALEA caveat at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) that “information acquired solely 
pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace 
devices . . . [i.e.,] call identifying information[,] shall not include any 
information that may disclose the physical location of the 
subscriber . . . .” proved insurmountable and could not be overcome by 
trying to marry § 2703 with the Pen/Trap Statute.84  As a result, the 
USMJ departed from the SDNY#1 opinion at that point.85  
Just as the DDC#3 USMJ did, the EDWIS court found the CALEA 
congressional testimony of FBI Director Freeh to be most telling and 
indicative of congressional intent:86   
. . . what is abundantly clear from . . . Director Freeh’s 
testimony is that the language which found its way into 
the law was predicated on the Director’s assertion to 
Congress that, in the government’s view, pen register 
and trap and trace devices were not to be, and would 
                                                 
82 EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 948-49 (E.D. Wis. 2006). 
83 Id. at 953. 
84 Id. at 956. 
85 Id. at 955. 
86 See, e.g., id. at 955-56. 
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not be, used to secure location information for the 
cellular phone user.87   
Even though the information sought here by the government was less 
comprehensive than that at issue in the DDC#3 opinion, the EDWIS 
USMJ was unpersuaded that this was a meaningful distinction.   
[T]he government is only seeking the location(s) of the 
cell towers being used by the cell phone at the 
commencement and termination of calls.  But, even such 
less precise location information was included in the 
‘tracking information’ about which Congress was 
concerned and to which Director Freeh’s mollifying 
remarks were directed.88   
Finally, the court opined that § 2703 could not be used to bootstrap 
the Pen/Trap Statute.  The USMJ remarked that “Director Freeh assured 
Congress that the legislation about which he was testifying and urging 
Congress to pass had nothing to do with, and did not relate to, the SCA, 
to wit, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq.”89  Unfortunately for the government, the 
                                                 
87 Id. at 956.  One segment from Director Freeh’s testimony quoted by the USMJ allowed 
that 
[s]ome cellular carriers do acquire information relating to the general 
location of a cellular telephone for call distribution analysis purposes.  
However, this information is not the specific type of information 
obtained from ‘true’ tracking devices, which can require a warrant or 
court order when used to track within a private location not open to 
public view. 
Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added).  The emphasized language is key and its 
significance appears to have been overlooked by the USMJs who have focused upon it but 
generally.  Taken together, Knotts and Karo, see infra  text accompanying notes 230-44, teach 
that a tracking order predicated upon the Fourth Amendment is required only when 
information regarding what transpires within a residence (or curtilage not open to public 
view) is to be obtained—if, in fact, such discriminating tracking is even possible.  As Knotts 
and Karo demonstrate, most subjects being tracked by law enforcement are out and about 
where they could be observed by the public and law enforcement.  But do the Fourth 
Amendment, Rule 41, the SCA, or the Pen/Trap Statute even apply (or are they needed) in 
such situations?  Prior to ECPA’s enactment (and of the Pen/Trap Statute within it), the 
DOJ would obtain pen register orders based upon Rule 57(b) and the All Writs Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1651.  Much like one’s whereabouts on the public thoroughfares, there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the digits one dials from one’s phone 
which one thus conveys to a third party.  See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979); United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977); In re the Application of U.S.A. for 
an Order Directing X to Provide Access to Videotapes, No. 03-89, 2003 WL 22053105 (D. 
Md. Aug. 22, 2003); United States v. Mosko, 654 F. Supp. 402 (D. Colo. 1987). 
88 EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 957. 
89 Id. at 958. 
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USMJ found its hybrid theory to be “much more a legislative collage 
than a legislative mosaic.”90   
G. Western District of Louisiana—January 2006 (WDLA)   
Because the government in WDLA sought only the same kinds and 
degrees of information at issue in SDNY#1, the substance and rationale 
of that decision were embraced by the WDLA USMJ.  Specifically, the 
SDNY#1 order   
did not authorize[ ] any cell site information that might 
be available when the user’s cell phone was turned ‘on’ 
but a call was not in progress. . . .  [As a result, the 
WDLA USMJ] adopt[ed] [the SDNY#1 USMJ’s] detailed 
analysis and will allow the Government to obtain the 
same information subject to the same limitations.91   
Also noteworthy was that unlike the situation presented with a “true 
‘tracking device’”—which cannot be disabled or turned off by the 
target—the court observed that a cell phone user can prevent anyone 
from obtaining the tracking information the instrument is generating by 
either powering off the phone or simply by not making any calls.92  
Further, said the court, “[u]nlike true tracking devices, locations within 
buildings cannot be determined by the information authorized by this 
ruling.”93  In any event, because the location information actually being 
sought by the government in the case before him was relatively inexact 
(it will “not permit detailed tracking of a cell phone user within any 
residence or building”) such that “[t]he Government will know only that 
the user has made or received a call on his cell phone, and that his cell 
phone communicated with a particular tower or towers during the 
call[,] . . . no Fourth Amendment concerns are implicated.”94   
                                                 
90 Id.  “If Congress intended to allow prospective cell site information to be obtained by 
means of the combined authority of the SCA and the Pen/Trap Statute, such intent is not at 
all apparent from the statutes themselves.”  Id. 
91 WDLA, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (W.D. La. 2006) (emphasis added).  The USMJ 
parenthetically remarked that the phones of some cell service providers, such as Nextel, are 
GPS-enabled which allows Nextel “to determine its users’ locations anytime the cell phone 
is turned on.”  Id. at 681.  Such authority was not sought here. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 682.  It is questionable whether so-called “true” tracking devices can, from the 
outside, ascertain where in a building the transmitting device is situated. 
94 Id. 
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H. Western District of New York—February 2006 (WDNY)   
Trying to build upon the SDNY#1 and WDLA decisions, the 
government tried its hybrid or “convergence” theory yet again, this time 
in the Western District of New York, where it sought a court order from 
a USMJ for relatively imprecise cell phone location information.  It asked 
for “cell site tower location information . . . at the inception and 
termination of a call made and received by an identified cellular 
telephone.”95  Such, the DOJ argued, would only provide the “general 
vicinity” and not a specific location for a phone.96  The USMJ, well aware 
of all of the preceding USMJ decisions discussed above, ultimately fell in 
line with the majority.   
First, however, the USMJ acknowledged those portions of DOJ’s 
hybrid/convergence argument that he found correct:  (1) “signaling 
information,” which—post USA PATRIOT Act97—an authorized pen 
register may obtain, includes “cell site location data”; (2) a pen register is 
permitted to “capture[ ]” such data upon the government’s certification 
that the “information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing 
criminal investigation”; (3) the SCA enables the government to secure 
historical cell site data upon a demonstration of “reasonable grounds to 
believe” that the information to be obtained is “relevant and material to 
an ongoing criminal investigation”; but that (4) CALEA prohibits the 
government from getting the very information it seeks pursuant to the 
Pen/Trap Statute’s “likely to be relevant standard[.]”98   
Then the USMJ turned to the shortcomings in DOJ’s argument, 
finding the “government’s ‘convergence’ argument unconvincing[,]” and 
found nothing in the express language of the Pen/Trap Statute, CALEA, 
or the ECPA that indicates judges should follow a theory converging the 
statutes.99  That Congress even envisioned such a unorthodox, tortured 
                                                 
95 WDNY, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 212 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).  Assisting the court in its 
understanding of the technology involved was a letter appended to the government’s 
pleadings from the “Court Order Compliance Manager” of cell phone provider Verizon.  
Id. at 213 n.3.  The degree of cell phone location information here being sought by DOJ 
would not make it possible to “pinpoint the exact location of the mobile phone” because, in 
part, Verizon’s “ability to provide a cell phone’s location ‘can range from several hundred 
meters to several miles.’”  Id. 
96 Id. at 212. 
97 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001). 
98 WDNY, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 214 (internal citations omitted). 
99 Id.  Continuing, the USMJ added, 
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matrimony of three disparate laws, the USMJ felt, was beyond the pale.  
He shared the concerns expressed by the majority of the Magistrate 
Judges—who had already considered the issue now before him “as to the 
wisdom and logic of predicating Congress’s intent to combine statutory 
provisions separately enacted over a fifteen year period to create a new 
and independent hybrid authorization mechanism on the use of the 
word ‘solely’ in the [CALEA] exception clause.”100   
Additionally, that the government had here limited its request to 
generalized (as opposed to equally available precise) cell phone location 
information was of no import.   
[T]here is nothing in the legislative history of CALEA to 
suggest that the exception clause was intended by 
Congress to create some sort of sliding scale pairing 
mechanism, with the evidentiary standard for ordering 
disclosure hinging on the type or duration of pen 
register data or signaling information sought by law 
enforcement.101   
If the Pen/Trap Statute, CALEA, and the SCA are to be converged, such 
intent should come from Congressional direction as opposed to DOJ 
supposition:  “The government’s concerns over the ‘ambiguity of the 
statutes’ are well founded, but it is the Congress and not the Department 
of Justice who is empowered to respond to those concerns.”102  
Concluding, the USMJ wrote that as that statutory framework now 
existed, prospective cell phone location information could only be 
obtained upon the basis of an application grounded upon probable 
cause.103   
                                                                                                             
[I]f Congress wanted judges to grant disclosure of real time cell site 
data by importing the procedural rules and safeguards of a statute that 
Congress directed not be used to authorize the disclosure of 
prospective cell site location data (the Pen Register statute) into a 
statute and under a standard that Congress specifically reserved for 
the production of historical telephone records (the SCA), Congress 
could have and would have clearly said so.  Congress did not. 
Id. at 214-15. 
100 Id. at 215.  Recall that the “exception clause” is 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B). 
101 WDNY, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 219.  The logic of this argument does much to undermine 
the theses underlying the SDNY#1 and WDLA decisions. 
102 Id. 
103 “The Court does not agree with the government that it should impute to Congress the 
intent to ‘converge’ the provisions of the Pen Statute, the SCA and CALEA to create a 
vehicle for disclosure of prospective cell location information on a real time basis on less 
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I. Southern District of West Virginia—February 2006 (SDWVA)   
Given the facts in the decision out of the Southern District of West 
Virginia, the USMJ did not directly address the issue of what, if any, 
statutes—alone or in combination—authorize federal law enforcement 
agencies (“LEAs”) to acquire real-time location information of a cell 
phone subscriber notwithstanding that the DOJ had specifically invoked 
both the Pen/Trap Statute and § 2703 in support of its application.104  
Here, the U.S. Marshals Service (“USMS”) was trying to locate a fugitive 
who was using someone else’s cell phone.105  Thus, the fugitive was not 
the paying customer of the cell phone service of investigative interest—a 
fact the USMJ found determinative.106   
Additionally, the USMJ gratuitously remarked that she was mindful 
of all the earlier published opinions written by her USMJ colleagues on 
the score and, like the majority of them, she was “unpersuaded by the 
government’s argument that Chapters 206107 and 121108 [of Title 18, 
U.S.C.], considered together, permit a court to authorize use of a pen 
register and trap and trace device in order to locate a subscriber using a 
cell phone in a geographical area, despite the provisions of 47 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(a)(1).”109  It was unnecessary, however, for her to specifically rule 
on the matter in order to dispose of the case because only a subscriber 
(who can also be a user), and not a mere user, i.e., one who is not also a 
                                                                                                             
than probable cause.”  Id.  The court parenthetically noted that at least one bill, S. 2130, 
109th Cong. (2006), sought to clarify the evidentiary standard necessary to obtain real 
time/prospective cell phone location information.  Id. at 219 n.6.  Senate Bill 2130 would 
require a Title III application—certainly a probable cause requirement—to obtain cell site 
data.  Also taking note of this bill, the SDNY#2 USMJ opined that “[i]f the Department of 
Justice needs to obtain prospective cell site location information in criminal investigations, it 
needs to ask Congress to explicitly grant it such authority.”  SDNY#2,  No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 
01, 2006 WL 468300, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006). 
104 More particularly, the application before the USMJ sought 
the use of a pen register which would capture and report at the same 
time, originating and terminating ‘Cell Site Location Information,’ 
which is defined as information which identifies the antenna tower 
receiving transmissions from that cell phone (and any information on 
what portion of that tower is receiving a transmission, if available) at 
the beginning and end of a particular telephone call made or received 
by the cell phone’s user . . . . 
SDWVA, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663, 664 (S.D. W. Va. 2006). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 666. 
107 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000). 
108 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2000). 
109 SDWVA, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 665. 
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subscriber, is protected under 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1).110  As a result, the 
USMJ granted the government’s application—certainly based upon less 
than probable cause—requiring the cell phone carrier to provide it with 
“Cell Site Location information for all calls made to or from the subject 
telephone for a period of sixty days from the date of [the court’s] Order, 
or until the arrest of the subject fugitive, whichever comes first.”111   
J. Disrict of Maryland—February 2006 (DMD#2)  
Three months after the government was denied an order for “real 
time cell site information’ . . . whenever the phone was on,” the same 
USMJ was asked for an order directing a wireless service provider to 
surrender “cell site information concerning the physical location of 
antenna towers associated with the beginning and termination of calls to 
and from the subject cellular telephone.”112  Borrowing from both 
§ 2703(d) and the Pen/Trap Statute (the hybrid theory), the government 
“proffered ‘specific and articulable facts’” demonstrating that there were 
“‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that” the information to be obtained 
would be both “relevant and material” to its ongoing investigation.113  
The court was as unimpressed with the government’s cobbled together 
approach this time as it was the last:   
the court DENIES the government’s request because the 
proffered statutory authority is insufficient.  Unless and 
until Congress takes further action, the court may only 
authorize disclosure of prospective cell site information 
upon a showing of probable cause pursuant to Rule 
41.114   
The government protested that this application was different in three 
particulars from the first:  (1) it was now seeking location information 
only at the inception and termination of calls, i.e., not also during the 
course of them; (2) it now wanted to know the location of only one cell 
tower “with which the target phone is communicating”; and (3) it sought 
only the location information “stored” by the carrier.115  The 
government’s attempt at differentiation was misplaced, countered the 
                                                 
110 Id. at 666. 
111 Id. 
112 DMD#2, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391 (D. Md. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). 
113 Id. 
114 Id.  The USMJ allowed that instead of using Rule 41, the government could also avail 
itself of the more stringent Title III standard.  Id. at 391 n.1. 
115 Id. at 392. 
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court, because the “earlier decision was not based on constitutional 
grounds but on the lack of statutory authority . . . .”116  The court did, 
however, rethink one aspect of its previous opinion and accepted “the 
government’s contention that a mechanism that transmits cell site 
information to the government falls within the definition of a pen 
register in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) [because] . . . .[c]ell site information is 
‘signaling information’ as discussed by [the Pen/Trap] statute[ ].”117  
However, just because the CALEA segment at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) 
precludes the sole use of the Pen/Trap Statute to secure such “signaling 
information,” does not mean the USMJ bought into the government’s 
hybrid argument:   
[T]he court pauses before concluding, based on the 
single word ‘solely,’ that Congress intended [CALEA] 
§ 103(a)(2)118 to affirmatively authorize disclosure of cell 
site information on a prospective basis through any 
combination involving the Pen/Trap Statute.  An 
equally valid interpretation of the ‘solely’ phrase is that 
Congress intended that authority to locate subscribers 
should derive largely, if not wholly, elsewhere.  At best, 
Congress was discouraging, not encouraging, reliance 
on the Pen/Trap Statute for this purpose.119   
Assuming arguendo that Congress intended that the Pen/Trap 
Statute be used in conjunction with a second law in order that 
prospective cell phone location information could be obtained, the court 
said, that additional statute certainly could not be § 2703.120  “First, the 
SCA simply is not and never was intended to be a statute that authorizes 
prospective surveillance . . . .  Second, § 103(a)(2) of CALEA was 
predicated on Director Freeh’s assertion that the SCA and the Pen/Trap 
Statute were distinct.”121  At the end of the day, concluded the USMJ, the 
government’s hybrid theory “is at best murky and, at worst, illusory.”122   
                                                 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 393-94. 
118 Codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2000). 
119 DMD#2, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 394-95. 
120 Id. at 395. 
121 Id.  “The SCA regulates access to records and communications in storage and 
therefore lacks provisions typical of prospective surveillance statutes[ ]” such as set time 
periods after which electronic surveillance must cease (absent renewal), reporting 
requirements, and prescribed sealing requirements.  Id. at 395 n.7. 
122 Id. at 396. 
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K. Southern District of New York—February 2006 (SDNY#2)   
The USMJ who authored this opinion was completely at odds with 
his colleague who wrote SDNY#1, thus setting up a split of authority 
within the same federal judicial district.123  Basing its application upon 
§ 2703(d), the government specifically sought authority to use a pen 
register to 
capture and report at the same time originating and 
terminating cell site location information (specifically, 
information which identifies the antenna tower 
receiving transmissions from that cellphone (and any 
information on what portion of that tower is receiving a 
transmission, if available) at the beginning and end of a 
particular telephone call made or received by the 
cellphone’s user, which information is to be transmitted 
from the cellphone’s service provider to the DEA and 
other law enforcement agencies)[.]124   
In denying the government’s application without reservation, the 
USMJ parenthetically observed that prospective cell site location 
information had been the frequent topic of USMJs both in the circuit and 
around the country, but that even though a fellow USMJ in the Southern 
District of New York had approved a comparable application by the 
government, this USMJ came to the opposite conclusion.125  In siding 
with the majority of USMJs who opined previously on the matter, the 
USMJ saw little need to rephrase those opinions or, in his words, to 
“reinvent the wheel,”126 but at the same time, he wanted to clearly set 
forth his understanding of that “majority” position.  He emphasized his 
agreement with the prior cases that had rejected the “‘hybrid’ statututory 
interpetation theory,” and thus declined to permit a combination of 
CALEA, the SCA, and the Pen/Trap Statute to obtain “prospective cell 
site location information.”127   
                                                 
123 Continuing, the USMJ observed that in so deciding he joined “eight decisions by 
seven other Magistrate Judges (including [two] Magistrate Judges in this Circuit) in 
concluding that statutory authority for prospective cell site location information is lacking.”  




126 Id. at *2. 
127 Id. 
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If the DOJ wants authority to obtain prospective cell site location 
information based upon a less than probable cause standard, the court 
concluded, it would be necessary to seek it from Congress.  Addressing 
the now-existing split within the Southern District of New York 
regarding cell phone tracking, the USMJ urged the government to file 
“timely objections to this Opinion with a Part I128 District Judge or 
otherwise seeking appropriate review by an appropriate District 
Judge.”129   
L. Eastern District of California—March 2006 (EDCA)   
In EDCA, the USAO sought information from a wireless service 
provider that would be “expected to identify the specific cell tower(s) 
‘handling’ the initiation, reception or maintenance of phone calls 
associated with the specified cell phone.”130  Given recent precedent, the 
USMJ surprisingly granted the government’s application “in all 
particulars” by “proper[ly] adhering to established rules of statutory 
construction[.]”131  The government’s hybrid theory—combining § 2703 
with the Pen/Trap Statute—was and is a perfectly reasonable work-
around addressing CALEA’s admonition that the Pen/Trap Statute 
cannot be the “sole” statutory basis by which to obtain a cell phone 
subscriber’s physical location.  Indeed, the USMJ castigated his 
colleagues who penned the earlier decisions, accusing them of   
using their “intuition” and going behind the plain 
meaning of an otherwise unambiguous statutory text in 
their use of legislative history . . . [to] conclude[ ] that 
only a warrant issued on probable cause or perhaps a 
wiretap application, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 aka “Title III,” will 
do for obtaining cell site location information.132   
The USMJ did, however, go out of his way to limit the scope of his 
order to that cell phone location information generated during the course 
of an actual wireless call.  In other words, the authorization provided 
                                                 
128 See generally N.Y. R. USDCTSD DIV. BUS. R. 3, a portion of which states that “[p]art I is 
established for hearing and determining certain emergency and miscellaneous matters in 
civil and criminal cases and for processing criminal actions and proceedings through the 
pleading stage.  Judges shall choose assignment to Part I from an appropriate 
schedule . . . .”  Id. 
129 SDNY#2, 2006 WL 4688300, at *2. 
130 EDCA, No.S-06-SW-0041, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2006). 
131 Id. at *2. 
132 Id. at *4.  “Legislative history cannot be utilized to create ambiguity in an otherwise 
unambiguous text.”  Id. at *5. 
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would not also extend to location information available at times when 
the phone, although turned on and registering, was not being used at the 
moment to make or receive a communication.   
While it is reasonable to think of roaming signals from a 
cell phone which is merely operative as signaling 
information, Congress has indicated that it desires to 
limit the acquisition of signaling information more 
narrowly to require a communication[ ] . . . [which] 
bespeaks the imparting of information by or between 
persons via electronic means, not the mere, constant 
contact of one machine with another machine.133   
M. Southern Disrict of Texas—April 2006 (SDTX#2)   
In this cell site tracking decision, the first by a U.S. District Judge, the 
court allied itself with the reasoning in the three earlier decisions 
granting the government limited relief because  
in the present case the government has included 
significant limits on the authorization it seeks.  The 
government is not seeking:  (1) to activate remotely the 
subject telephone’s GPS functionality; (2) to obtain 
information from multiple cellular antenna towers 
simultaneously to ‘triangulate’ the precise location of a 
cell phone; or (3) to place calls to a particular cell phone 
repeatedly or otherwise track on a continuous basis the 
location of a cell phone when no call is being placed or 
received.134   
According to the court, the government here sought permission to 
install a pen/trap device (as opposed to commanding a cell phone 
provider to produce pen/trap information) in order to obtain “cell-site 
information at the origin and termination of calls and, if reasonably 
available, during the progress of a call that is not initiated by the 
government itself.”135  Concluding that the government was only a little 
                                                 
133 Id. at *7 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 1001(2) (2000)).  “Thus, a valid order permitting the 
acquisition of signaling information refers only to the information generated by a phone 
call, i.e., a communication.”  Id. 
134 SDTX#2, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
135 Id. 
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bit pregnant, the court opined that the government “met its statutory 
burden under 18 U.S.C. § 3121 et seq. and § 2703(d).”136   
N. Southern District of Indiana—June 2006 (SDIND)   
This decision differs from all the others discussed in this article 
because here the U.S. District Judge ruled—after the cell site location 
information had been obtained—upon a defendant’s motion to suppress 
the data received from a carrier pursuant to a USMJ order.  This 
contrasts with the other opinions covered in that they discuss whether, 
in the first instance, an order directing a carrier to provide cell site 
location information should even be entered.  Here the tracking 
information had been prospectively obtained following entry of a 
USMJ’s 60-day order in response to the government’s pleading, the latter 
having been based upon 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1)(B)(ii), 2703(d), 3124, or 
some combination thereof.137  Based upon cell site location data obtained 
from the carrier along with other cell phone location information 
gathered with a deliberately unspecified government electronic device, 
DEA, and the U.S. Marshals service determined that a phone belonging 
to an indicted fugitive was located in a Chicago multi-unit dwelling.   
The defendant raised the argument138 that “receipt of cellular site 
information” as the result of the USMJ’s order approving of the 
government’s hybrid theory “exceeded the limitations imposed by those 
statutes [Pen/Trap and SCA] in permitting a cell phone to become a 
tracking device.”139  Also, argued the defendant, any order permitting 
acquisition of cell phone location information must be grounded upon 
probable cause and not upon “specific and articulable facts.”140  The 
court concluded that neither the SCA nor the Pen/Trap Statute 
                                                 
136 Id. 
137 The text of the order, not a paragon of clarity, seems to indicate such.  SDIND, No. IP 
05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181, at *1 n.5 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006); see also id. at *6 
(indicating the government proceeded using its “hybrid” theory).  However, footnote 15 
states that the order to obtain cell site location information from the carrier for 60 days was 
predicated upon 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).  Id. at *6 n.15.  Note that the government secured the 
arrest not only by relying only upon cell site location information received from a cell 
phone service provider but from information received from one of the government’s own 
cell phone tracking devices.  Id. at *1 n.1. 
138 Id. at *6.  It is sometimes difficult to discern whether the court is addressing issues 
surrounding acquisition of cell phone location information from the carrier or from the 
government’s electronic device. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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“cover[ed] real time cell site information[.]”141  In finding the SCA 
inapplicable, the court came to the now familiar conclusion that “real 
time cell site information is not a ‘stored communication’ or record and 
therefore is not covered by [18 U.S.C.] § 2703(c).  Further, the title of the 
section itself suggests that cell site information is not included.”142  
Additionally, the court concluded that the Pen/Trap Statute could not 
apply to prospective cell site location information because of the CALEA 
exception.143  Its position eroding, the government countered that even if 
the SCA and the Pen/Trap Statute did not provide a basis upon which to 
undergird the order, neither did those statutes provide suppression as a 
remedy.  The court concurred:  “We agree that the statutory language in 
the Pen/Trap Act and the SCA does not mandate exclusion of such 
evidence as the sanction for violations of those requirements, and in fact, 
the [SCA] expressly rules out exclusion as a remedy.”144   
If the government’s hybrid theory does not provide a basis for the 
accumulation of real-time cell site location information, what does?   
                                                 
141 Id. at *7.  Parenthetically, and somewhat bizarrely, the court said that Title I of ECPA, 
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), consisted of “provisions governing tracking 
devices.”  SDIND, 2006 WL 3197181, at *7.  Of the eleven sections in Title I, only one—
section 108—dealt with tracking devices.  The purpose of section 108 was to add § 3117, 
Mobile tracking devices, to Title 18, U.S. Code.  Section 3117(a) (2000), which provides that if 
a tracking device installation warrant or order is issued in one judicial district, it may be 
monitored in all districts.  Section 3117(b), does nothing more than provide a bland, 
unremarkable definition of “tracking device” which is said to be “an electronic or 
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”  To 
suggest, therefore, that Title I is chock-full of tracking device provisions is to miss the mark.  
In fact, the great bulk of ECPA’s Title I makes changes to Title III, Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968), the latter 
having originally been enacted in 1968. 
142 Id.  The court accurately points out the “structural differences” between statutes 
relating to the acquisition of historical records and those dealing with the collection of data 
to be created in the future “suggest” the conclusion that “Congress did not intend the SCA 
to cover real time tracking of a cell phone.”  SDIND, 2006 WL 3197181, at *7 n.20. 
Unlike the parts of the ECPA regulating real-time surveillance, the 
SCA regulates access to records and communications in storage.  As 
such, the SCA imposes no limit on the duration of the government’s 
access, no provision for renewal of the court order, no requirement for 
periodic reports to the court by the government, and no automatic 
sealing of court records.  In contrast, all of these provisions appear in 
statutes governing prospective surveillance like wiretap and pen/trap 
orders. 
Id. 
143 Id. at *8. 
144 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2000), Exclusivity of remedies, part of the SCA, which 
provides that “The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter [i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 2701-
2712] are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of the 
chapter.”). 
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Because the ECPA was not intended to affect the legal 
standard for the issuance of orders authorizing these 
devices [tracking devices], a Rule 41 probable cause 
showing and procedures were (and still are) the 
standard procedure to authorize the installation . . . of 
mobile tracking devices.145   
But a Rule 41/Fourth Amendment violation could occur in the case 
of cell phone tracking only if there were a warrantless search.  “In other 
words, only if a Fourth Amendment privacy interest exists which would 
be violated by the government’s mobile tracking of a cell phone, is a 
warrant necessary for the search.”146  Researching the law in the Seventh 
Circuit, the court could find no “binding precedent” which would 
inform it whether a Rule 41 probable cause warrant were needed “before 
the government can use cell site information to track a cell phone’s 
location.”147  Relatedly the court could neither find any guidance 
concerning whether a defendant has a suppression remedy if the 
government fails to obtain a Rule 41 warrant to obtain cell site location 
information.148  The court opinions which exist on the score, discussed in 
this Article, “are procedurally distinguishable in that the issue arose 
there when the government requested receipt of cell site information in a 
warrant application[.]”149  In any event, the court concluded “that no 
statutory basis exists for suppression of the evidence[ ]”150 which left 
upright only a Fourth Amendment analysis.   
Basing his argument on Kyllo v. United States,151 the defendant next 
raised the compelling argument that because the tracking at issue 
“intruded into his private dwelling [his apartment], as opposed to a 
public place,” the warrantless gathering of cell site location information 
constituted a Fourth Amendment violation.152  The court rejected this 
contention, concluding that,  
in Kyllo, law enforcement targeted the home to gain 
information relating to activities underway inside.  Here, 
                                                 
145 Id. at *10 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added). 
146 Id.  The court added that “[t]he warrantless monitoring of a tracking device located in a 
public place generally does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at *8 n.25 (citations 
omitted; emphasis added). 
147 Id. at *10. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at *11. 
151 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
152 SDIND, 2006 WL 3197181, at **11-12. 
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law enforcement officers targeted a particular phone 
only as to its location . . . .  [The law enforcement officer] 
did not obtain any information regarding [the 
defendant’s] home, beyond the fact that the target phone 
was present in one of the three apartment units at [the 
street address.]153   
Additionally, and no doubt drawing upon United States v. Miller,154 
the court concluded that the defendant brought law enforcement 
scrutiny on himself by leaving his cell phone on, which “knowingly 
exposed” his signaling information “to a third-party, to wit, the cell 
phone company.”155  
O. Northern District of Indiana—July 2006 (NDIND)   
In a 2006 case out of the Northern District of Indiana, the 
government appealed the denial of a cell site location application which 
had been grounded upon the Pen/Trap-SCA hybrid theory, but the U.S. 
District Judge upheld the USMJ to whom the pleading was initially 
presented.  Sought were both historical and “real time” location 
information.  “Either way,” the court said, “the Government is 
requesting an order requiring cellular phone companies to identify the 
specific cell tower from which a call originates, is maintained, or received 
for an incoming or outgoing call . . . .  [S]uch information is unobtainable 
absent a warrant.”156  Recalling that one thrust of CALEA was to ensure 
that pen/traps could not be used to secure cell phone location 
information, the court noted that the earlier decisions rejecting the 
government’s hybrid theory did so because the purpose of the 
government’s cell site location information request “is to accomplish 
what Congress attempted to avoid, that is, permitting law enforcement 
to track individuals using cell location information.”157  The court, like 
many of the others before it, also examined (then) FBI Director Freeh’s 
congressional ELSUR testimony and quoted with approval the EDWIS#1 
USMJ who said that it made absolutely “no sense” to him “that, by use of 
the word ‘solely’ in 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2), Congress was in some back-
handed fashion intending to allow the SCA to be used in conjunction 
                                                 
153 Id. at *13. 
154 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see infra note 294 and accompanying text. 
155 SDIND, 2006 WL 3197181, at *13.  “Though the signal originated from within [the 
defendant’s] residence, it was capable of being monitored outside the home.”  Id.  The final 
nail in the defendant’s coffin was his lack of standing because the phone that was tracked 
to his apartment belonged to someone else. 
156 NDIND, Nos. 1:06-MC-6, 1:06-MC-7, 2006 WL 1876847, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006). 
157 Id. at *4. 
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with the Pen [Register] Statute to obtain the very information that 
Director Freeh assured Congress he was not seeking authority to obtain 
under the proposed legislation.”158  As a result, the court endorsed the 
conclusion reached by the NDIND USMJ that   
(1) the Government cannot rely on the Pen Register 
Statute to obtain cell site location information; and (2) 
converging the Pen Register Statute with the SCA in an 
attempt to circumvent the exception in CALEA is 
contrary to Congress’ intent to protect cell site location 
information from utilization as a tracking tool absent 
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.159   
In the course of further explaining its denial of the government’s 
application, the court again turned to the EDWIS#1 opinion, upon which 
it heavily relied, where it was observed that any evidence of 
congressional intent to allow the combined authority of the SCA and the 
Pen Register Statute to provide the basis for obtaining cell site 
information was missing from the statutes.160   
P. Southern District of Texas—July 2006 (SDTX#3)   
In light of the SDTX#2 opinion by a U.S. District Judge, and because 
the government now limited the scope of its cell site location information 
request, USMJ Smith (the author of SDTX#1) again considered a 
government Pen/Trap-SCA hybrid application.161  The USMJ 
emphasized that “[n]o published court opinion has yet agreed with the 
government that unlimited cell site information is obtainable via the 
combined authority of the Pen/Trap Statute, CALEA, and the SCA.”162   
That said, and believing that SDNY#1 was the best opinion so far 
which championed the government’s hybrid approach, in again denying 
the government’s application, USMJ Smith proceeded to take on 
SDNY#1 directly.  The government’s statutory convergence theory, he 
said, first proceeded from the belief that the Pen/Trap Statute is the 
                                                 
158 Id. at **12-13 (quoting EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 958 (E.D. Wis. 2006)). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at *5 (quoting EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 958). 
161 “Invoking the same legal theory rejected by this court last fall, the Government again 
seeks to obtain an order authorizing access to prospective cell site information as part of a 
criminal investigation.”  Id.  The court unflatteringly referred to the Government’s hybrid 
theory as a “three-rail bank shot.”  SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828 (S.D. Tex. 2006) 
(quoting SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex 2005)). 
162 SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 827. 
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“exclusive mechanism” by which cell phone “signaling” information 
could be obtained.163  The USMJ dismissed this contention, saying that of 
necessity it results in the illogical conclusion that “a judge who would be 
compelled to grant a pen register application solely upon the 
Government’s certification of relevance must deny that application if the 
Government goes further and establishes probable cause under Rule 
41.”164  In fact, one court had already determined that such a conclusion 
was “absurd.”165  In particular, the “[l]egal process is calibrated to the 
degree of intrusion.  So ‘the greater the privacy interest at stake, the 
higher the threshold Congress uses.’”166  Further the USMJ explained, the 
Supreme Court had already specifically ruled in United States v. New York 
Telephone Co.167 that pen register authorization could be secured with a 
warrant satisfying Rule 41.168   
The second peg upon which the government’s hybrid theory rested 
is the conclusion that CALEA’s “solely pursuant” caveat mandates the 
addition of a second, not-inconsistent grant of statutory authority—such 
as the SCA—which, when paired with the Pen/Trap Statute, will permit 
the acquisition of cell site location information.  However, “CALEA 
legislative history contains no clue that its drafters imbued the word 
‘solely’ with the significance now attributed by hybrid proponents.”169  
Further, “[t]he ‘solely pursuant’ phrase leaves open the possibility that a 
pen/trap order may be neither necessary nor sufficient to obtain such 
[cell site location] data . . .  [It] may be one route, but not the only route, 
to obtain cell site [location] information.”170   
The third prong of the hybrid theory incorporates the SCA.  But that 
statute “expressly prohibits a phone company from disclosing subscriber 
information ‘to any governmental entity,’ except under certain carefully 
delineated circumstances[,]”171 and of the six exceptions, not one 
mentions a conjoining with the Pen/Trap Statute.  “In fact, the sixth 
                                                 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. (citing DMD#2, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 n.11 (D. Md. 2006)). 
166 Id. at 829. 
167 See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977). 
168 “In support of its Rule 41 holding, the Court twice invoked a variant of the ‘greater 
includes the lesser’ maxim: ‘[I]t would be anomalous to permit the recording of 
conversations by means of electronic surveillance while prohibiting the far lesser intrusion 
accomplished by pen registers.’”  SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 830 (citing United States v. 
N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 170 (1977)). 
169 SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 832. 
170 Id. at 832-33; see supra note 35; Alternative Legal Foundation, infra Part III.A. 
171 SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 834. 
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exception (authorizing disclosure ‘to any person other than a 
governmental entity’) underscores that the primary intent of the 
prohibition was to guard against unwarranted access to subscriber 
information by the government.”172  In sum, the USMJ concluded that the 
government’s convergence or hybrid theory “self-destructs, its initial 
premise at war with its intended conclusion.”173   
Other factors also argue against the hybrid theory, to include “the 
temporal gaps among the relevant statutes:  15 years between the ECPA 
and the PATRIOT Act, 7 years between CALEA and the PATRIOT Act, 
and 4 years between the effective dates of CALEA’s amendment of the 
SCA and the CALEA proviso[.]”174  Coupled with this is the statement of 
CALEA’s sponsor in the House describing the final bill as placing 
limitations on law enforcement’s use of phones as tracking devices.175  
Finally, another detraction from the hybrid theory is that none of the 
opinions which have given it credence by permitting the acquisition of 
limited cell site location information directly tackled the 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3117(b) tracking device definition.176   
Statutory infirmities aside, the hybrid theory also raises 
unsatisfactorily addressed constitutional issues.  “If the dual [hybrid] 
theory were found to authorize the limited cell site data sought here, it 
must necessarily authorize far more detailed location information, such 
as triangulation and GPS data, which unquestionably implicate Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights.”177  In short, the USMJ held fast to his 
original opinion and looked askance at SDTX#2, the opinion by a U.S. 
District Judge which intervened between USMJ Smith’s opinions in 
SDTX#1 and SDTX#3.   
Q. District of Maryland—July 2006 (DMD#3)   
Notably this decision was authored by the USMJ who also wrote 
both DMD#1 and DMD#2.  The procedural history of the case is both 
unusual and interesting.  The government sought prospective cell site 
location information for the purpose of apprehending a fugitive and it 
presented sufficient probable cause evidence to underpin a Rule 41 
                                                 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 835. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. (internal citation omitted; emphasis added by USMJ). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 837.  One truly cannot be just a little bit pregnant: “The constitutional problems 
created by this [hybrid] interpretation of the electronic surveillance statutes are the same, 
regardless of the breadth of cell site data sought in a given case.”  Id. 
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search warrant.  The USMJ advised the government that he would issue 
such a warrant upon submission of an affidavit, but the government 
declined to do so   
because it considered this a test case for its position that 
an order to obtain prospective cell site information can 
be entered upon less than probable cause pursuant to 
the combined authority of [the Pen/Trap statute and the 
SCA] provided the government offers “specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that . . . the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.”  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).178   
But, having twice rejected the government’s hybrid theory before, 
the USMJ did not hesitate to reject it a third time.179   
R. Eastern District of Wisconsin—October 2006 (EDWIS) 
Choosing again to beat its head against the wall yet another time, the 
government relied upon its hybrid theory in seeking limited cell site 
location information180 and lost before both the USMJ and the U.S. 
District Judge to whom subsequent appeal was made.181  Framing the 
issue, the court noted “that the issue is not whether the government can 
                                                 
178 DMD#3, 439 F. Supp. 2d 456, 456-57 (D. Md. 2006). 
179 “I have twice rejected this [hybrid] position, as have the majority of other courts to 
consider it.  I advised the government that, without a sworn affidavit, I would deny its 
application for prospective cell site information, and, to the extent the application seeks 
such information, it is hereby DENIED.”  Id. at 457. 
180 The government sought “the originating and terminating cellular tower, a map of 
tower locations, and the physical address of all cellular towers in the applicable market—
commonly referred to as the J-Standard[.]”  EDWIS#2, No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743, 
at *3 n.2 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006).  The court recognized the “little bit pregnant” posture of 
the government’s request for limited cell site location information, noting that “nothing in 
its statutory argument would forbid it from obtaining triangulation information for the 
entire cell or even when the phone is simply on but not in use. . . .  Indeed, courts have 
rejected similarly ‘narrowed’ requests.”  Id.  But what is the “J-Standard?”  After 
“extensive” discussions with the FBI, the J-Standard (J-STD-025) was established by the 
Telecommunications Industry Assn. (“TIA”), “an accredited standard-setting 
body[.] . . .  [The J-standard], outlines the technical features, specifications, and protocols 
for carriers to make subscriber communications and call-identifying information available 
to law enforcement agencies having appropriate legal authorization.”  U.S. Telecomm. 
Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
181 Oddly, at some point the government appears to have abandoned its hybrid theory in 
favor of a successful probable cause presentation before the USMJ.  EDWIS#2, 2006 WL 
2871743, at *3. 
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obtain cell cite [sic] information.  Rather, the issue is the standard it must 
meet before a court will authorize such disclosure.”182  The court then 
began its opinion by providing a hierarchical overview of the relevant 
Federal statutes governing ELSUR:  Title III, which the court dubbed a 
“super warrant[,]”183 the SCA, which “imposes an ‘intermediate’ 
standard on the government[,]”184 and the Pen/Trap Statute, which 
“requires the lowest quantum of information.”185  Completing that task, 
the court also threw in both 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b), which rather unhelpfully 
does nothing more than provide a definition of the term “tracking 
device,” and CALEA, believing each was relevant to the issue at hand.   
Inexplicably, and apparently incorrectly reading both Knotts186 and 
Karo,187 the court then wrongly stated that “to obtain such a [tracking] 
device, the government must meet the probable cause standard set forth 
in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.”188  (As will be discussed below in Part III.A, 
Alternative Legal Foundation, probable cause is definitely not needed in all 
instances to install or monitor a tracking device.)189  However, the court 
seems to correct itself by citing both Knotts and Karo before concluding 
that “[i]t is doubtful that the government’s use of cell site information to 
track a suspect implicates the Fourth Amendment, requiring use of the 
probable cause standard as a constitutional matter.”190   
The court summarized the Government’s hybrid argument as one 
which contends that “the Pen/Trap statute must be coupled with some 
other statute due to the restriction contained in CALEA.”191  The court 
was adamant that this conclusion “is simply wrong”192 because “[a]s the 
Supreme Court has held, authorization of a greater intrusion [e.g., Title 
III, search warrant] necessarily authorizes a lesser intrusion [e.g., pen 
register/trap and trace, cell site data].”193  Thus “there is no reason to 
believe that CALEA requires the coupling of the Pen/Trap statute with 
the SCA or any other statute, as opposed to requiring the government to 
                                                 
182 Id. at *1. 
183 Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted). 
184 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
185 Id. 
186 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
187 See United States v. Karo, 468 US 705 (1984). 
188 EDWIS#2, 2006 WL 2871743, at *2. 
189 See infra Part III.A. 
190 EDWIS#2, 2006 WL 2871743, at *5 n.6. 
191 Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
192 Id. at *4. 
193 Id. at *4 nn.3-4 (internal citations omitted). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/2
2007] Cell Phones as Tracking Devices 1451 
make its request under Rule 41 or [18 U.S.C.] § 2518.”194  The court then 
assessed whether the SCA, Rule 41, or 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) was “the best 
source of authority for accessing telephone information.”195  Opting in 
favor of Rule 41, and despite the government’s denial that cell site 
information is a “tracking device” under § 3117(b), the court determined 
that a Rule 41 probable cause warrant is “‘the standard procedure for 
authorizing the installation and use of mobile tracking devices.’”196   
Despite already having reached its conclusion that cell site location 
information, if it is to be had at all, should be obtained by Rule 41 in 
conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 3117 or pursuant to Title III, the court 
nevertheless entered upon an extended discussion of why the 
government’s hybrid theory is unpalatable.  First, to the extent the SCA 
can be said to apply, cell site location information cannot come within its 
ambit because the statute relates to “electronic communication service” 
which in turn, provides users with the “ability to send or receive wire or 
electronic communications.”197  But a wire communication is one 
involving an “aural transfer,”198 which cell site location information is 
not, and by its terms, an electronic communication does not include “any 
communication from a [18 U.S.C. § 3117] tracking device[,]”199 which is 
what a cell phone becomes when its signals are used to determine the 
mobile’s whereabouts.  “‘Real-time location monitoring effectively 
converts a cell phone into a tracking device . . . .’”200  Second, the SCA 
relates to “stored” or historical information and not to prospectively 
obtained data.  In other words, the statute “pertains to the production of 
existing records, not information that will be created in the future related 
to future communications.”201  Third, although the SCA provides, by 
exceptions, for the release of certain data to a “governmental entity,”202 
none of the exceptions reference the Pen/Trap Statute.203  “Fourth, the 
pairing of the Pen/Trap statute and the SCA—which were enacted at 
different times (as was CALEA)—is not mentioned in any statute or 
                                                 
194 Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
195 Id. at *5 n.6. 
196 Id. at *5 (citing SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005)). 
197 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2000). 
198 Id. § 2510(1), (18). 
199 Id. § 2510(c). 
200 EDWIS#2, 2006 WL 2871743, at *5. 
201 Id. at *6. 
202 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c). 
203 EDWIS#2, 2006 WL 2871743, at *6 (quoting SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 834 (S.D. 
Tex. 2006)). 
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specifically discussed in the legislative history.”204  Joining most courts 
which have considered the issue to date, U.S. District Judge Adelman 
concluded her opinion by rejecting the government’s hybrid theory and 
requiring the government to meet the probable cause standard to obtain 
cell site information.   
S. Southern District of New York —October 2006 (SDNY#3)   
In this appeal of SDNY#2,205 U.S. District Judge Kaplan, apparently a 
strict constructionist, came to a result opposite that of Judge Adelman, 
finding that even though Congress may not have explicitly intended that 
the Pen Register Statute and the SCA be coupled together, the language 
of the two Acts “clearly” authorized disclosure of cell site information.206  
In constructing this conclusion, the court determined that the signals a 
cell phone transmits to one or more towers to make a call constitutes 
“signaling information” for purposes of the Pen Register Statute.207  
Turning next to the “solely pursuant” language at 47 U.S.C. 
                                                 
204 Id.  The Pen/Trap provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127, were originally enacted as part 
of ECPA on October 21, 1986, amended by CALEA on October 25, 1994, and further 
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001.  Recall that the SCA was enacted 
as title II of ECPA, see supra note 15. 
205 Only limited tracking information was sought. 
206 SDNY#3, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  In a nod toward sanity, the court 
allowed that “Congress nevertheless may wish to consider whether this result is consistent 
with its intention.”  Id.  The government here sought limited cell site location information 
in the hope, one would think, that its limited request would be more likely to win judicial 
favor.  As noted earlier, however, such an approach is like arguing that one is but a little bit 
pregnant.  The court recognized this sophistry: 
Many of the initial applications for cell site information sought 
information that could be used for triangulation.  After these 
applications were rejected by many courts, however, the government 
began to request information regarding only one tower at a time, 
apparently in the hope that applications for less detailed and invasive 
information would meet with a warmer judicial reception.  This 
application is part of the latter group . . . .  The government’s 
arguments for statutory authorization, however, apply equally 
whether information is obtained from one antenna tower at a time or 
from many simultaneously.  Id. at 452 (internal citations omitted). 
207 Id. at 455.  Before citing United States Telecommunications Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 455 
(D.C. Cir. 2000), as additional authority in support of this outcome, Judge Kaplan observed 
that “[a] number of the judges to address this issue have reached the same conclusion, even 
several who ultimately denied applications for cell site information for other reasons.”  
SDNY#3, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 455.  Responding unasked to those USMJs deciding to the 
contrary, “. . . the Court  presumes that Congress knew—when it added the term ‘signaling 
information’ to the definitions of pen registers and trap and trace devices in 2001—that the 
D.C. Circuit had interpreted that term to include cell site information in the United States 
Telecomm. Ass’n decision a year earlier.”  Id. at 456 (citation omitted). 
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§ 1002(a)(2),208 the court determined that the “most natural” reading of 
the provision is that cell site location information can properly be 
disclosed “pursuant to the Pen Register Statute and some other statutory 
authority.”209  Reaching a contrary conclusion, even if such is arguably 
supported by legislative history,210 would mandate “reading the word 
‘solely’ out of the statute entirely, which would violate ‘the settled rule 
that the Court must, if possible, construe a statute to give every word 
some operative effect.’”211  The next hurdle to the government’s hybrid 
approach was the contention that prospective cell site information is not 
cognizable under the SCA.  Indeed, most of decisions already discussed 
accepted the contention that “although [18 U.S.C. § 2703] might cover 
historical cell site data, [it] does not authorize the disclosure of such data 
on a ‘real-time’ or forward-looking basis.”212   
Further blocking the adoption of the hybrid approach is the 
argument that none of the traditional safeguards currently part of 
ELSUR statutes exist after pairing the SCA with the Pen/Trap Statute, 
e.g., there is no “limit [on] the duration of law enforcement surveillance 
pursuant to a court order [nor is there a] require[ment for] automatic 
sealing of such orders to maintain secrecy surrounding ongoing 
surveillance.”213  The court found this dodge “unpersuasive” because, (1) 
not only does the SCA not contain any surveillance time constraints 
which would circumscribe the collection of prospective cell site location 
information, but even more importantly, (2) “the information the 
government requests is, in fact, a stored, historical record because it will 
be received by the cell phone service provider and stored, if only 
momentarily, before being forwarded to law enforcement officials.”214  A 
                                                 
208 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
209 SDNY#3, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 457. 
210 Id.  “Indeed, both the Senate and House Reports on CALEA asserted that the 
respective bills ‘expressly provide[ ] that the authorization under the pen register and trap 
and trace orders cannot be used to obtain tracking or location information, other than that 
which can be determined from the phone number.’”  Id. at 457-58 (internal citations 
omitted). 
211 Id. at 458 (citation omitted). 
212 Id. at 459. 
213 Id.  “Several of the magistrate judges and amicus [Federal Defenders of New York] 
here contend that if Congress had intended the Stored Communications Act to permit 
prospective surveillance, ‘it would have included the same prospective features it built into 
the wiretap and pen/trap statutes.’”  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
214 Id. (citing SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).  The fact that there 
may be momentary storage should be beside the point.  What should matter is that the 
government’s application seeks information not yet in existence at the time an order would 
be signed.  Further, see supra note 29, cell site location information can be pushed both to 
law enforcement and the service provider at the same time. 
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third reason supporting rejection of the amicus’s argument is that the 
Pen/Trap Statute—to which the SCA would be metaphorically glued—
does have ELSUR duration limitations which would result from a 
pairing with the Pen/Trap Statute.215  A final argument raised against 
the marriage of the Pen/Trap Statute with the SCA is that part of the 
latter, 18 U.S.C. § 2711, incorporates definitions from Title III and, more 
particularly, the definition of “electronic communication” which, in turn, 
specifically excludes “any communication from a tracking device (as 
defined in section 3117)[.]”216  The court also found this contention to be 
“unpersuasive” and even considers resolution of the question whether a 
cell phone meets the statutory definition of a “tracking device” to be 
“immaterial” because 18 U.S.C. § 2703 allows a court “upon a proper 
showing, to order disclosure of “a record or other information pertaining 
to a subscriber to or a customer of an electronic communications service.”  It 
does not authorize the disclosure of an “electronic communication.”217   
Cherry picking statutory provisions even further, the court also 
concluded that, 
because a cell phone provider is an “electronic 
communications service” and cell site information is a 
“record or other information pertaining to a subscriber 
to or a customer of” the cell phone provider, the logical 
conclusion is that Sections 2703(c) and (d) permit a court 
to order the disclosure of prospective cell site 
information upon a proper showing by the government.  
The Stored Communications Act, then, provides the 
additional authority for cell site information required by 
CALEA.218   
                                                 
215 “The Stored Communications Act is being asked to play only the supporting role of 
providing the required additional authorization for the disclosure of information already 
permitted by the Pen Register Statute.  Accordingly, it makes sense that the Pen Register 
Statute would provide the procedural framework.”  SDNY#3, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 459.  If, as 
the District Judge posits, the pen/trap plays the principal role in the unclean, bizarre 
conjoining of the pen/trap and SCA provisions, then why does the CALEA admonition at 
47 U.S.C. § 1002 against using pen/trap authority to locate cell phones not also play a 
primary (as opposed to supporting) role? 
216 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (2000).  Recall that 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) tells us that a “‘tracking 
device’ [is] an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement 
of a person or object.” 
217 SDNY#3, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 460. 
218 Id. at 460-61. 
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The court then addressed the concern expressed by many of the earlier 
opinions that to the extent a cell phone is a § 3117 tracking device, an 
order permitting the provision of cell site location information to the 
government must be predicated upon probable cause.  The court 
correctly pointed out that by its terms, 18 U.S.C. § 3117 advises that a 
“warrant or other order”219  may be secured upon an adequate showing 
thus permitting court authorization to issue upon less than probable 
cause.220  More significantly, the court correctly noted that § 3117 relates 
only to the installation and not the monitoring of a tracking device.221   
Amici raised an interesting but flawed argument when they stated 
that, statutes aside, the Fourth Amendment mandates a probable cause-
grounded warrant because Karo222 requires such an order “if the device 
would disclose its location inside a person’s home and that information 
could not have been observed from public spaces.”223  The court 
conceded that a Karo violation is within the universe of possibilities but 
that a Karo analysis at this juncture would be premature.224  As a result, 
the court granted the government’s hybrid theory-based application for 
limited cell-site location information.225   
T. Eastern District of California—February 2007 (EDCA#2)  
In another of the relatively few opinions favorable to the 
government, the same USMJ who authored EDCA#1 recited that in an 
earlier order he had determined that cell site location information 
constituted “subscriber information accessible to law enforcement upon 
                                                 
219 Id. at 461. 
220 “Accordingly, Section 3117 specifically ‘contemplates that a tracking device may be 
installed pursuant to an ‘order’—that is, without a warrant and thus without a probable 
cause showing’”  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
221 Id. at 453; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a). 
222 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
223 SDNY#3, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 462. 
224 “At this point, however, the Court has no way of knowing if the government will use 
any cell site information it obtains in this manner.  If it does, and information leads to 
indictment, the issue can be litigated on a motion to suppress.”  Id. 
225 Rather unartfully, the court stated that use of 
The pen register and/or trap and trace device is authorized to capture 
(1) the calls made and received by the subject cell phone and (2) 
information which identifies the antenna tower receiving 
transmissions from that cell phone at the beginning and end of a 
particular telephone call made or received by the telephone’s user, 
including any information on what portion of that tower is receiving a 
transmission at the beginning and end of a particular telephone call. 
Id. at 463.  The court’s phrasing is unartful because “capturing calls made and received” 
would require a Title III. 
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order”226 grounded upon the government’s hybrid theory.  Note that in 
the course of his decision, USMJ Hollows determined that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3117(b) “does not include the acquisition of cell site information in the 
terms ‘tracking device’” because that statute has to be understood in the 
context of when it was enacted as part of ECPA in 1986 and upon so 
doing, it is clear that the “device contemplated” by § 3117(b) “was only 
of the ‘beeper’ variety.”227  Looking to § 3117(b)’s legislative history, the 
USMJ also concluded that the acceptance of previously recorded location 
information from a cell phone company was not “installation of a 
device.”228   
Intriguingly, and in a parenthetical footnote, the court said—
seemingly at variance with Karo229—that tracking a cell phone being used 
inside a residence is actually,  
all done outside the home via cell towers.  Unless the 
agents are calling the suspect’s phone, the agents have 
no control over the suspect’s use of the cell phone 
whatever in his location, did not cause or initiate the cell 
phone signal, and are not keying in on the cell phone 
signal inside the home.  Mathematical triangulations made 
from different cell phone towers outside the home which 
will reveal a general area where the suspect may be 
found is hardly probing inside the house.230   
This Article has demonstrated that in the great majority of opinions 
where the matter has arisen, courts have opined that the government’s 
hybrid or convergence approach is legally bankrupt and that only a 
Fourth Amendment/Rule 41 warrant is an acceptable underpinning for 
an order directing cell phone carriers to provide cell phone location 
information to law enforcement.  In the discussion which follows, 
however, a third, largely untried option is suggested.   
                                                 
226 EDCA#2, No. 07-SW-034 GGH, 2007 WL 397129, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2007). 
227 Id. at *2. 
228 Id at * 1 n.1. 
229 Supra note 7.  Recall that in Karo, however, the tracking was made possible by a 
government-installed device which was emanating signals as a result of that installation. 
230 EDCA#2, 2007 WL 397129, at *1 n.2. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
A. Alternative Legal Foundation   
Instead of continued pursuit of a legal offensive underpinned by the 
Pen/Trap Statute, the SCA, CALEA, or a hybrid of some or all of the 
three, it may be appropriate to take a step backwards and attack from a 
different vector, from another direction—one not based upon a 
precarious statutory mélange but upon fundamental Fourth Amendment 
law.   
Knotts231 and Karo232 teach that electronically monitoring the changing 
location of an object or a person is not a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment so long as the shifting situs of the thing being 
tracked could be determined by visual observation made from a spot 
where one is legally permitted to be, e.g., from a public highway.  This 
result follows because such observations do not intrude upon an 
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.  If there is no search, there is no need for a warrant based 
upon probable cause.  So long as the surveilled person or object is neither 
within a curtilage that is not open to public observation or within a 
residence, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy attached to the 
movements of the person or object.233   
Both cases were decided in the 1980s, i.e., a decade before CALEA, 
and the second decision followed closely on the heels of the first, just a 
year later.  It may be helpful to review the facts in both of these opinions.  
Often there are four events in connection with the utilization of a 
“traditional” tracking device each of which could implicate the Fourth 
Amendment:  installation, repair/maintenance, monitoring, and 
removal.  Inasmuch as Knotts never contested the legality of the device’s 
installation, the case bearing his name only concerned monitoring.234  
                                                 
231 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
232 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
233 Put differently, the key questions is whether, “without a warrant, the Government 
surreptitiously employs an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have 
obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of [a] house.”  Id. at 715. 
234 As a practical matter, there was nothing to contest: With the consent of a chemical 
manufacturer, Minnesota law enforcement personnel installed a “beeper” inside a 5-gallon 
container of a precursor chemical, chloroform, useful in the production of controlled 
substances.  When one of the defendants bought the chloroform, the officers were able to 
follow it from Minneapolis to just outside Knott’s “secluded cabin near Shell Lake, 
Wis[consin].”  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.  “Under a barrel outside the cabin, officers located the 
five-gallon container of chloroform.”  Id. at 279. 
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Law enforcement personnel were able to track a five-gallon chloroform 
container with a “beeper” hidden therein as it was driven to the exterior 
of a lakeside cabin owned by Knotts.235  Warrantless monitoring of the 
“beeper” or tracking device, Knotts contended, violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  But the Supreme Court found otherwise:   
A person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his movements from one place to another.  When [the 
co-defendant] travelled over the public streets he 
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the 
fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a 
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, 
and the fact of his final destination when he exited from 
public roads onto private property.236   
That the chloroform came to rest on private property was of no 
consequence because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy 
with respect “to movements of [conveyances and] objects such as the 
drum of chloroform outside the cabin in the ‘open fields.’”237  The 
expectation was lessened because the tracking device revealed nothing 
more than what the police could have seen had they chosen to tail the 
driver all the way to Knotts’ cabin.238  “Visual surveillance from public 
places along [the driver’s] route or adjoining Knotts’ premises would 
have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police.”239  Since the 
monitoring did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy, neither 
a search nor a seizure under the Fourth Amendment took place.240   
The facts in Karo were surprisingly similar.  Karo and his co-
defendants ordered fifty gallons of ether which were to be used to 
extract cocaine from imported clothing previously impregnated with the 
                                                 
235 Based upon information in addition to that supplied by the tracking device, law 
enforcement personnel secured a search warrant, raided the cabin, and discovered an 
“operable” clandestine drug laboratory containing enough precursors “to produce 14 
pounds of pure amphetamine.”  Id. 
236 Id. at 281-82.  Knotts “undoubtedly had the traditional expectation of privacy within a 
dwelling place insofar as the cabin was concerned[.]”  Id. at 282 (emphasis added). 
237 Id. (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)). 
238 “But there is no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information 
as to the movement of the drum within the cabin, or in any way that would not have been 
visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin . . . .  [N]otions of physical trespass based on 
the law of real property [are] not dispositive.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
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drug, but unfortunately for Karo, the vendor he chose was an informant 
who permitted DEA to substitute an ether container equipped with a 
tracking device.241  DEA was thus able to track the container’s rather 
circuitous route as it was transferred from place to place and vehicle to 
vehicle, until it was driven to a house rented by three of Karo’s co-
defendants.  Because of the threat of compromise, the agents were 
unable to conduct tight visual surveillance, and thus did not know 
whether the ether remained in a vehicle parked outside or had been 
moved in or around the house.  After all of the defendants’ vehicles left, 
however, agents could tell by the signal from the at-rest tracking device 
that the ether remained at the house.   
The vendor’s consent obviated the need for an installation warrant, 
but was a court order nonetheless needed to monitor the tracking device 
that had been hidden in the ether container?  The question was squarely 
presented to the Supreme Court:  does “monitoring of a beeper in a 
private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violate[ ] the 
Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the 
privacy of the residence[?]”242  Concluding that the Fourth Amendment 
had been contravened in this instance, the court was quick to contrast the 
facts with those in Knotts, “for there the beeper told the authorities 
nothing about the interior of Knotts’ cabin.”243  Here, on the other hand, 
“the Government surreptitiously employ[ed] an electronic device to 
obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation from 
outside the curtilage of the house.”244  As a result, the court maintained 
                                                 
241 In addition to the vendor’s consent allowing installation of the tracking equipment, 
DEA had obtained a warrant permitting both installation and monitoring.  United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1983).  Defendants successfully challenged the sufficiency of the 
warrant (because it contained misleading statements) which left the Supreme Court to 
determine the legality of the (now) warrantless installation and monitoring.  Id. at 710, 718 
n.5. 
242 Id. at 714. 
243 Id. at 715 (emphasis added). 
244 Id. 
The beeper tells the agent that a particular article is actually located at 
a particular time in the private residence and is in the possession of the 
person or persons whose residence is being watched.  Even if the 
visual surveillance has revealed that the article to which the beeper is 
attached has entered the house, the later monitoring not only verifies 
the officers’ observations but also establishes that the article remains 
on the premises. 
Id.  But is this comment accurate?  If circumstances were otherwise and had there been no 
concern about the compromise of physical surveillance, DEA could have ringed the house 
360° with binocular-equipped agents and would have learned the same information 
reported by the tracking device—that the ether had been moved from a vehicle to the 
inside of the house where it then remained.  The device was not, apparently, sufficiently 
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“the general rule that a search of a house should be conducted pursuant 
to a warrant.”245   
Twenty years after Knotts and Karo, the Sixth Circuit got it right.  
Recall the facts in Forest246—DEA dialed the cell phone of one of the 
defendants (but did not let the phone ring).  DEA then queried the 
service provider and learned what cell towers were being “hit” by the 
phone, thus learning the defendant’s general location.  This enabled DEA 
to re-establish physical surveillance of the target.  Among other things, 
the defendant argued that DEA “effectively turned his cellular phone 
into a tracking device . . . .” in violation of his Fourth Amendment 
rights.247  Forest tried to argue that the facts in his case were different 
from those in Knotts and that the “cell-site data provided information 
that the DEA agents could not have obtained simply by following his 
car.”248  But it is not what the agents saw or did not see that matters; 
rather, it is what could have been observed by third parties that counts.  
The court emphasized that “[a]lthough the DEA agents were not able to 
maintain visual contact with [the defendant’s] car at all times, visual 
observation was possible by any member of the public.  The DEA simply 
used the cell-site data to ‘augment[ ] the sensory faculties bestowed upon 
them at birth,’ which is permissible under Knotts.”249   
The defendant then argued that if he did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to his location, he did have one with 
respect to the “cell-site data itself.”250  This protection existed, according 
to the defendant, because: (1) unlike the situation presented in Knotts, 
                                                                                                             
discriminating or accurate to reveal in which room or on which floor the ether came to rest.  
Because the device disclosed no information in addition to what could have been 
discovered by 360° visual surveillance, arguably the Supreme Court was incorrect in its 
analysis and no monitoring warrant should have been required.  The tracking device 
indicated only that it was inside the house and at no point did it reveal what law 
enforcement personnel could have discerned with the five senses had they been inside the 
residence in lieu of the tracking device.  Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (use of 
thermal imaging device to detect heat emanating from the interior of a residence 
constitutes a search).  “We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained 
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at 
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.”  Id. at 34 
(internal citations omitted). 
245 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 718. 
246 United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004). 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 951. 
249 Id.  (internal citations omitted). 
250 Id. 
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neither the transmitting nor receiving instruments belonged to the 
government; (2) the defendant’s contract with the service provider did 
not authorize disclosure of his cell-site data; and (3) the information DEA 
obtained by “pinging” his phone was not the result of any affirmative 
action on his part, i.e., unlike the situation in Smith v. Maryland,251 
because he had not dialed any outgoing digits nor was he in 
communication with anyone when DEA dialed his phone.252  The Sixth 
Circuit was unimpressed, opining that any difference between the 
defendant’s location and his cell-site data was one without a 
distinction.253  Given the facts of the case, it simply was “not legally 
significant” because the “cell-site data is simply a proxy for [the 
defendant’s] observable location.”254  Consequently, the court found 
Knotts to be controlling and thus concluded that DEA had not conducted 
a Fourth Amendment search.255   
Contrary to the warning expressed in DMD#1, law enforcement has 
historically acted at “its peril” and yet suffered no epidemic of adverse 
consequences by engaging in the warrantless, electronic monitoring of 
tracking devices installed within or on conveyances and objects that 
travel on publicly accessible highways, waters, and airspace.  Where is 
the legal consistency in requiring a different result just because the 
location-identifying equipment belongs to parties other than the 
government?  The nature of the information obtained by the government 
is the same, whether from its own radio equipment or from a cell phone 
service provider.256  The majority of USMJs, having lost sight of this, are 
letting the tail wag the dog.   
Concededly, it is certainly possible and permissible for a statute to 
impose more stringent requirements upon police during the 
performance of law enforcement activity than constitutionally provided 
                                                 
251 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979). 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Forest, 355 F.3d at 951. 
255 Id. at 951-52. 
256 When government-owned devices are utilized, law enforcement has dominion and 
control over the receiver and has at least dominion over the transmitter.  When cell phones 
are tracked, the transmitter, i.e., the cell phone, is controlled by the user and the receiving 
equipment is typically within both the dominion and control of the service provider.  
Installation of a government-owned device will often require an intrusion to install the 
device; such an incursion in many instances occasions the infringement of a privacy 
interest that society would judge to be reasonable thus necessitating a Rule 41 warrant.  
However, no installation need be effected when a cell phone is the tracking device.  Thus, 
the use of a cell phone to determine a user’s location can be less invasive than utilization of 
a government setup. 
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baselines.  However, neither the Pen/Trap Statute nor § 2703 imposes 
even a probable cause requirement and, in any event, seventeen of the 
cases just discussed determined that the two laws are simply 
inapplicable. 257  As already mentioned, this is because (1) the Pen/Trap 
Statute cannot be applied to cell phone tracking inasmuch as 47 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(a)(2)(B), part of CALEA, instructs that the specific location or call-
identifying information such “devices” can provide “shall not include 
any information that may disclose the physical location of the 
subscriber”; and (2) § 2703 relates to stored or historical information as 
opposed to that which is acquired—as is also the case with Title III 
orders and pens/traps—in real-time.   
B. Director Freeh’s Remarks in Context  
At least three of the USMJ cases258 discussed Director Freeh’s 1994 
remarks, which were made immediately prior to CALEA’s passage so it 
would do well to correctly understand the historical timeframe in which 
they were made.259   
As previously noted,260 the Pen/Trap Statute was enacted as part of 
ECPA in 1986, and it was then that both apparatuses were first defined:  
they were both declared to be “devices”261 and not “devices” plus 
“processes”—as has been the case ever since the instruments’ meanings 
were amended fifteen years later by the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act.262  In 
short, at the time when Director Freeh presented his 1994 prepared 
statement to the joint meeting of the Hill subcommittees, pen registers as 
                                                 
257 But cf. Title III vis-à-vis the Fourth Amendment. 
258 See EDWIS, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 2006); WDNY, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 
(W.D.N.Y. 2006); DDC#2, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2005). 
259 Louis J. Freeh, Director, F.B.I., Statement before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Technology and the Law and the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights (Mar. 18, 1994), reprinted in Federal Document Clearing House, 1994 
WL 223962 [hereinafter Freeh Testimony]. 
260 See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra note 1.  The ECPA set forth the definitions of both terms at Section 103 
thereof.  Section 103, in turn, set forth original chapter 206 of 18 U.S.C. which included the 
definition of  “pen register” at what was then (1986), the new 18 U.S.C. § 3126(3), as 
a device which records or decodes electronic or other impulses which 
identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone 
line to which such device is attached, but such term does not include 
any device used by a provider or customer [for billing, recording as 
incident to billing, cost accounting, or other like purpose]. 
Similarly, (then) new 18 U.S.C. § 3126(4) defined “trap and trace” as a “device which 
captures incoming or other impulses which identify the originating number of an 
instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted[.]” 
262 These amendments occurred some seven years after Director Freeh’s testimony. 
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well as trap and trace devices were somewhat rudimentary mechanical 
instruments that required physical connection to telephone wires in 
order to be able to print out the digits customers actually dialed, as well 
as the times of day traditional telephones went on and off-hook when 
making or receiving calls.  The pen/trap devices, as statutorily defined 
in 1986, were thus incapable of determining cell phone locations—a not 
unusual instance where legislation lagged behind technological advance.  
According to a cell phone industry association, the use of cell phones in 
the United States did not even commence until the mid-1980s. 263   
Examined against this backdrop, at the time Director Freeh’s 
remarks were presented to the two subcommittees meeting jointly, 
pen/trap “processes” made possible by computer software which would 
permit the record-keeping of some cell phone location information was a 
somewhat distant, if not unimagined vision—especially for law 
enforcement investigative uses—which explains his somewhat indefinite 
comment that “[s]ome cellular carriers do acquire information relating to 
the general location of a cellular telephone for call distribution [as 
opposed to user tracking] analysis purposes.”264  Thus, the entire portion 
(captioned Allegations of “Tracking” Persons265) of his prepared statement 
must be viewed through this lens.  The practice of securing real-time cell 
phone location information for law enforcement purposes from wireless 
service providers was in its infancy, and could not yet be considered an 
arrow in the police quiver.  Thus, Director Freeh conceived of cell phone 
location information as data only for business—”call distribution 
analysis purposes”—and not, in his words, for the sort of “true tracking” 
engaged in by law enforcement for criminal investigative purposes.   
Yet “true tracking” was the practice discussed in both the Knotts and 
Karo decisions, of which the Director was well aware.266  Both matters 
                                                 
263 According to the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association—The 
Wireless Association, the first commercial cellular system began operation in the United 
States (Chicago) in October 1983; the second system started in December 1983 in the 
Baltimore/Washington, D.C. corridor.  By 1986, there were only 1,000 cell sites in the 
country.  There were 10 million cell phone users in the U.S. by 1992 and 10,000 cell sites.  By 
1997, the number of cell sites had risen to 50,000.  There are now over 100 million wireless 
subscribers in the U.S.  See generally Cellular Telecommunications and Internet 
Association—The Wireless Association, The History of Wireless, http://www.ctia.org/ 
content/index.cfm/AID/101 (last visited Apr. 7, 2007). 
264 See WDNY, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis added); Freeh Testimony, 
supra note 259 (emphasis and explanation provided). 
265 See Freeh Testimony, supra note 259, at 32-33. 
266 Director Freeh even provided a citation to United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), 
supra note 259. 
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were decided a decade before the Director’s statement and held that no 
Fourth Amendment probable cause orders/warrants were needed to 
track the movements of suspects traveling out in public.  Conversely, 
“‘true’ tracking” “require[s] a warrant or court order when used to track 
within a private location not open to public view.”267  Cell phone location 
“transactional” information obtained and retained for business 
purposes--and thus not “true tracking” information—could be secured 
from the service providers by law enforcement with either “court orders 
or subpoenas” as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2703.268  The Director knew the 
difference between subpoenas, court orders, and warrants.  Warrants 
were needed for real-time tracking if the target were “within a private 
location not open to public view.”  No warrants were required, therefore 
(as Knotts and Karo instructed), for all other real-time tracking.   
Thus, when Director Freeh said that “call setup information”—real 
time dialing data traditionally obtained by pen/trap instruments which 
“identifies the origin and destination of a wire or electronic 
communication,”269—would not also “include any information that may 
disclose the physical location of a mobile facility or service beyond that 
associated with the number’s area code or exchange,”270 he was speaking 
of the information then known to be obtainable by pen/trap 
instruments.  This “call setup information” was in contrast with 
“transactional” data, which includes generalized location information 
that in 1994 was understood to be data kept by carriers “for call 
distribution analysis purposes” and thus considered to be historical 
records that law enforcement could obtain “exclusively” via 18 U.S.C., 
chapter 121 (the SCA).271   
Put differently, and in Director Freeh’s mind, the CALEA caveat 
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B)—which provides that call-
identifying information obtained by pens/traps “shall not include any 
information that may disclose the physical location” of the subscriber—
had nothing to do with and cannot be seen as a restriction upon real-time 
cell phone location information that carriers are today (well post-1994) 
                                                 
267 Karo, 468 U.S. 705. 
268 See Freeh Testimony, supra note 259, at 33 (emphasis added) (recalling that ECPA, 
including 18 U.S.C. §§  2701-2710, the SCA, was enacted in 1986—eight years before the 
Director’s testimony). 
269 E-mail is an example of an “electronic communication” and, in that context, an 
example of a “communication address” that is “similar” to a telephone number would be 
an e-mail address. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 31. 
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capable of providing via pen/cell “processes” to law enforcement.  In 
order to engage in a legislative history analysis, the 1994 CALEA 
constraint upon pen/trap “devices” cannot be applied to 2006 pen/trap 
“processes.”   
C. Operating in “Peril”   
Recall that the DMD#1 USMJ cautioned that “[t]o the extent the 
government seeks to act without a warrant, the government acts at its 
peril, as it may not monitor an electronic tracking device in a private place 
without a warrant.”272  This remark is consistent with the 
aforementioned 1994 testimony of FBI Director Freeh as well as the 
lessons from both Knotts and Karo.  The majority of the USMJs failed to 
latch on to the seemingly obvious notion that the cell phone location data 
sought by the government from the service providers did not—
according to the facts of each case—originate from such a private place.  
Thus, no probable cause-based court orders or Rule 41 search warrants 
were constitutionally required to conduct the location surveillance 
requested.   
Further, the exactitude of real time cell phone location information 
currently available from service providers is insufficient to determine the 
floor or room within a residence where the cell phone user is situated.  
Thus, if all that current, technologically obtainable real time cell phone 
location data can reveal is that a suspect is inside a residence, how can 
this information nugget be more invasive than the visual observation to 
the same effect by agents armed with binoculars encircling the area?273  
                                                 
272 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (emphasis added). 
273 See United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951 (6th Cir. 2004) (recalling that “cell-site 
data is simply a proxy for [the cell phone user’s] observable location”).  Let’s assume for 
the sake of argument—binoculars aside for the moment—that a police determination of the 
target’s mere presence (without more) inside a residence or protected-from-view curtilage is 
an invasion of privacy that society would recognize to be unreasonable absent a warrant.  
Should the chance, even if remote, that the suspect may venture into a residence (his? hers? 
someone else’s?) preclude a law enforcement agency from securing cell phone location 
information from a wireless service provider?  Even if this were the case, a suggested work-
around would be to borrow from the minimization requirements of Title III [18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518(5)] so that at such time as it became apparent that the subject was about to enter a 
constitutionally-protected area, the law enforcement agency would cease reception of the 
cell phone location information from the service provider subject, of course, to the periodic 
re-initiation of reception every several minutes to ensure that the target has not departed.  
Note that in the case of foreign language Title III (communication content) intercepts, even 
after-the-fact minimization is permissible in certain instances, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5): “In the 
event the intercepted communication is in a code or foreign language, and an expert in that 
foreign language or code is not reasonably available during the interception period, 
minimization may be accomplished as soon as practicable after such interception.”  
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The DMD#1 USMJ was more on the mark than perhaps he realized 
when he said that, “[i]f acquisition of real time cell site information is 
equivalent to a tracking device, it would seem the government is not 
constitutionally required to obtain a warrant provided the phone 
remains in a public place where visual surveillance would be 
available.”274   
Bingo.  How is it, then, that the USMJs proceeded from the 
unremarkable but prescient statement just quoted to the mandate that 
such information can be procured only with a Rule 41 warrant?  It truly 
boggles the mind; certainly logic does not inspire (let alone compel) such 
a conclusion.   
D. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57, the All Writs Act, and the Inherent 
Power of the Courts   
As indicated earlier, before the Pen/Trap Statute was enacted in 
1986, the situation was not unlike it is today with cell phone location 
information:  an order compelling the assistance of a third party was 
needed so that law enforcement could gain access to information it 
needed to further a criminal investigation—even though the order was 
not constitutionally mandated inasmuch as the desired information was 
unworthy of constitutional protection. 275  The absence of a statute 
specifically setting forth a regime for pen/trap orders did not 
meaningfully hinder law enforcement prior to 1986.  Effective orders 
were secured using a combination of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
57(b) (“Rule 57”),276 the All Writs Act,277 and the court’s inherent power.  
Use of these in combination, although suggested by dicta in United States 
                                                                                                             
Certainly the interception of communication content impinges upon Fourth Amendment 
considerations much more than does cell phone user location information. 
274 See DMD#1, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (D. Md. 2005). 
275 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
276 Rule 57(b) reads in part that “[a] judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent 
with federal law, these rules, and local rules of the district.”  See also SDTX#3, 396 F. Supp. 
2d 747, 830 n.31 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
277 All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000), states 
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress 
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.  (b) An 
alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a 
court which has jurisdiction. 
A rule or decree nisi is “[a] court’s decree that will become absolute unless the adversely 
affected party shows the court, within a specified time, why it should be set aside.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 441 (8th ed. 2004). 
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v. New York Telephone Co.278 proved to be a workable, pre-Chapter 206 
stratagem.279   
Instead of using the largely unsuccessful hybrid theory, federal 
prosecutors should consider steering clear of the inapplicable Section 
2703, the Pen/Trap Statute, and CALEA (that well is already poisoned) 
and instead rely upon the arguments found successful in Knotts,280 
Karo,281 and Forest282 when seeking an order based upon Rule 57(b), the 
All Writs Act, and the court’s inherent authority.  Although the Justice 
Department frowns on such an approach, it certainly could not fare any 
worse than proceeding upon the hybrid theory.   
Of the USMJ decisions chronicled above, only three discussed the 
Rule 57(b) and/or the All Writs Act approach, EDNY#2, SDTX#3,283 and, 
in passing, WDNY.284  Although the EDNY#2 USMJ did not question the 
“correctness” of the earlier decisions upholding orders based upon the 
All Writs Act, he nevertheless “conclud[ed] that they [did] not advance 
the government’s cause here.”285  This was because the decisions 
                                                 
278 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 170 (1977).  At the time New York Telephone 
Co. was decided, Rule 57(b) read that “[i]f no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, 
the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or any 
applicable statute.”  Id.  The communication carrier in New York Telephone Co. had refused 
to help the FBI install a pen register despite the existence of an order supported by 
probable cause, arguing that an order adhering to the more stringent Title III standard was 
required.  Id.  Although we now know from a subsequently decided case that probable 
cause need not have been proffered, see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the FBI had, 
in fact, grounded its application upon that level of proof.  Even though Rule 41, by its 
terms, spoke only of solid objects until this past December, the rule was “not limited to 
tangible items but [was] sufficiently flexible to include within its scope electronic 
intrusions . . . .”  N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 169.  Buttressing that conclusion, the court 
remarked that its 
conclusion that Rule 41 authorizes the use of pen registers . . . is 
supported by Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 57 (b). . . . Although we need not 
and do not decide whether Rule 57(b) by itself would authorize the 
issuance of pen register orders, it reinforces our conclusion that Rule 
41 is sufficiently broad to include seizures of intangible items such as 
dial impulses recorded by pen registers as well as tangible items. 
Id. at 170. 
279 See, e.g., United States v. Mosko, 654 F. Supp. 402, 405 (D. Colo. 1987) (pre-ECPA/All 
Writs Act order issued for pen register operations). 
280 United States v. Knotts, 60 U.S. 276 (1982). 
281 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
282 United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004). 
283 SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 831 n.31 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
284 In a footnote, the WDNY USMJ simply adopted the position advanced by the EDNY#2 
USMJ.  WDNY, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219-20 n.7 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). 
285 EDNY#2, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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championed by the government were, in the USMJ’s view, not 
sufficiently on all fours with the facts before him.  In United States v. 
Mosko, for example, the defendant challenged the pen register evidence 
against him on the ground that the underlying order should have been 
based upon probable cause.286  In rejecting the defendant’s suppression 
request, the Mosko court correctly cited to Smith287 when observing that a 
pen register order need not be grounded upon probable cause 
and─without embellishment or conclusion─observed that the pen 
register order had been secured in reliance upon the All Writs Act.  
“Second,” remarked the court in EDNY#2, “none of the cited cases relied 
on the All Writs Act to trump existing statutory law governing the use of 
investigative techniques, nor did any of them purport to fill a gap in an 
existing statutory scheme.”288  In should be pointed out, however, that 
the Mosko court was aware that the Pen/Trap Statute had been passed 
but determined that the provision had no retroactive effect such that it 
would impact upon the facts of the case at bar.  Thus, the court was 
aware that the All Writs Act approach did fill a legislative weakness not 
repaired until the enactment of ECPA.289   
Although the Mosko court did not expressly rule on the propriety of 
securing a pre-ECPA pen register authorization with an All Writs Act 
order, this does not obliterate the fact that such an All Writs Act order 
allowing pen register operations was sustained.  It is certainly plausible 
to suggest that the Mosko court did not directly address the All Writs Act 
issue because:  (1) law enforcement use of a pen register simply does not 
implicate any privacy interests secured by the Constitution and thus 
there was no longer a basis left upon which the defendant could 
successfully fashion a suppression argument; and because (2) the 
defendant never contended that the All Writs Act was an insufficient 
foundation upon which to underpin a pen register order.   
The EDNY#2 USMJ saw the chasm but either could or would not 
make the leap:   
The government thus asks me to read into the All Writs 
Act an empowerment of the judiciary to grant the 
executive branch authority to use investigative 
techniques either explicitly denied it by the legislative 
branch, or at a minimum omitted from a far-reaching 
                                                 
286 United States v. Mosko, 654 F. Supp. 402, 405 (D. Colo. 1987). 
287 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
288 EDNY#2, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 326. 
289 Mosko, 654 F. Supp. at 405 n.1. 
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and detailed statutory scheme that has received the 
legislature’s intensive and repeated consideration.  Such 
a broad reading of the statute invites an exercise of 
judicial activism that is breathtaking in its scope and 
fundamentally inconsistent with my understanding of 
the extent of my authority.290   
The fact of the matter, as actually demonstrated by Mosko, is that 
when Congress either fails to act or has not yet acted (as in the case where 
investigative practice or technological advancements outpace existing 
statutory provisions), or simply has not thought to act, legal 
workarounds are fashioned, and many succeed─again, as in Mosko─until 
the law catches up.  Certainly “sneak and peek” searches were 
conducted before 18 U.S.C. § 3103a was enacted as part of the USA 
PATRIOT Act.291  From the ELSUR arena, recall that when Title III 
intercept targets speak in code or use a language for which law 
enforcement does not have a translator immediately available, after-the-
fact minimization is statutorily permitted.292  Before 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) 
was amended to legislatively permit such an operational approach, 
however, such after-the-fact minimization had been judicially sanctioned 
before Congress could change the law to effect a “catch up” with existing 
practice.293  This is the same scenario faced now with respect to cell 
phone tracking─no statute specifically addresses the topic, and a work-
around, such as with Rule 57(b) and the All Writs Act, should be 
fashioned until such time as Congress may act on the matter, especially 
since the DOJ’s hybrid theory has been so underwhelming.   
E. Voluntarily Conveying Information to Third Parties   
In the course of reaching its conclusion that “[t]he installation and 
use of a pen register . . . was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required 
[to conduct pen register operations,]”294 the Supreme Court in Smith v. 
                                                 
290 EDNY#2, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 326. 
291 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); see, e.g., United States v. 
Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993).  “A sneak and peek warrant is one that authorizes 
officers to secretly enter (either physically or electronically), conduct a search, observe, take 
measurements, conduct examinations, smell, take pictures, copy documents, download or 
transmit computer files, and the like; and depart without taking any tangible evidence or 
leaving notice of their presence.”  Charles Doyle, Terrorism: Section by Section Analysis of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, CONG. RES. SERV. at 9 (Dec. 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/ terrorism/usapatriot/RL31200.pdf. 
292 See supra note 73. 
293 See, e.g., United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1236-37 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Cale, 508 F. Supp. 1038, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
294 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979). 
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Maryland295 analogized the circumstances surrounding one who dials 
digits from a phone (and thus conveys those numbers to a third party, 
i.e., the telephone company) to that of a customer providing personal 
financial information to a bank with whom the customer conducts 
business.296   
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to 
another, that the information will be conveyed by that 
person to the Government. . . .  This Court has held 
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third 
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, 
even if the information is revealed on the assumption 
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be 
betrayed.297   
Thus, one who carries a cell phone about─depending upon one’s 
perspective─is doubly cursed:  not only does the user lack any 
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to his/her movements out 
in public, s/he is also damned with respect to the numbers s/he dials 
because those digits are voluntarily conveyed to the service provider.  
The user “assumes the risk” that any information s/he surrenders to a 
third party will be provided to law enforcement authorities.  Despite 
arguments from some of the USMJs to the contrary,298 this same 
argument holds true with regard to the cell phone location information a 
user broadcasts every time the instrument is turned on.  Just as no one 
                                                 
295 Id. 
296 This analogy was based on the facts in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).  
Congress was so unhappy with the Miller decision, which was constitutionally based, that 
it passed a law to statutorily protect the financial information customers pass along to their 
banking institutions.  See the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000). 
297 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443). 
298 Discussing both Smith and its treatment by Forest, the SDTX#1 USMJ said “[u]nlike 
dialed telephone numbers, cell site data is not ‘voluntarily conveyed’ by the user to the 
phone company.  As we have seen, it is transmitted automatically during the registration 
process, entirely independent of the user’s input, control, or knowledge.”  SDTX#1, 396 F. 
Supp. 2d 747, 756-57 (S.D. Tex. 2005).  According to the SDTX#1 USMJ, Forest concluded 
that Smith was inapplicable to cell phone location information.  Id. at 757.  Even if Forest 
could be read to that effect, this is flawed reasoning.  The registration may be “automatic” 
but it is the user who sets everything in motion─thus causing the registration─by 
voluntarily turning the cell phone on or, if it is on, by consciously electing not to turn it off.  
The user thus has “control” over the registration process.  A telephone user presses a speed 
dial button and the instrument automatically phones a number; a telephone user presses a 
power button and the instrument automatically registers. 
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forces a bank customer to do business with a financial institution, no one 
forces a target to use a cell phone.  It is the user’s conscious decision to 
activate and operate the instrument and s/he “assumes the risk” that the 
service provider will turn over to law enforcement the location 
information that the user broadcasts while carrying about a cell phone in 
operation.   
F. 18 U.S.C. § 3117   
There are only two places in Title 18 where the term “tracking 
device” is used: once within Title III at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C),299 and 
again within § 3117 itself.  Perhaps meaningfully, the term is nowhere to 
be found in either the Pen/Trap Statute, CALEA, or the SCA.  The 
ECPA, the same public law which brought forth both the Pen/Trap 
Statute and the SCA, was the same act which also added Section 3117 to 
Title 18.300  “Tracking device,” therefore, was certainly a term of which 
Congress was well cognizant.  If either the Pen/Trap Statute or the SCA 
were meant to govern tracking operations, surely Congress knew to say 
so, particularly in the same bill, but it did not, which strongly suggests 
that neither the Pen/Trap Statute nor the SCA was intended or meant to 
govern electronic tracking.  It is certainly a canon of statutory 
interpretation that a law whose language is drafted generally will be 
trumped by one written more specifically or precisely.301   
It is also black letter law that legislative history is not consulted if the 
statute to which it relates is clear on its face.302  The problem with this 
particular adage, of course, lies in its application (the devil is always in 
the details):  a law that is clear to one person is cloudy to the next.  That 
said, if one begins with the words of 18 U.S.C. § 3117, we know that it 
                                                 
299 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C), which references 18 U.S.C. § 3117, provides that the term 
“electronic communication” does not include “any communication from a tracking device 
(as defined in section 3117 of this title)[.]”  In other words, no part of Title III covers 
tracking device operations. 
300 ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 108, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3117.  
Recall that Title III was passed in 1968, the ECPA was enacted in 1986, and CALEA became 
law in 1994. 
301  Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another 
deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two 
should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter 
will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general 
statute, unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the 
general act controlling. 
2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51:05, at 244-46, 248, 256-
57 (6th ed. 2000). 
302 Id. at vol. 2A, § 46:01, pp. 118-19. 
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defines “tracking device” as “an electronic or mechanical device which 
permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”303  A cell 
phone easily falls into this category.  By its terms, the statute also tells us 
that court permission to use a “tracking device” can come by way of “a 
warrant or other order.”304  (Unfortunately, the provision fails to instruct 
which “other order” would be satisfactory.)  What the statute does not 
say is telling—there is no requirement that the “other order” be based 
upon probable cause.  Thus, we might properly conclude that court 
authorization need not be in the form of a warrant and resultantly need 
not be based upon probable cause.  18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) does not even 
make it clear whether court authorization is required in all instances 
before electronic/mechanical tracking device operations can commence; 
it merely recites that “[i]f a court is empowered to issue a warrant or 
other order for the installation of a mobile tracking device, such order 
may authorize the use of that device within the jurisdiction of the court, 
and outside that jurisdiction if the device is installed in that 
jurisdiction.”305  This begs the question whether a court order to “use” a 
tracking device is required if the “device” does not require installation.   
If we dare turn to § 3117’s legislative history, the waters get 
somewhat muddied.  The relevant Senate Report says that “electronic 
tracking devices (transponders) . . . are one way radio communication 
devices that emit a signal on a specific radio frequency.  This signal can 
be received by special tracking equipment,306 and allows the user307 to 
trace the geographical location of the transponder [with] [s]uch ‘homing’ 
devices[.]”308  If a “tracking device” is a one-way radio, how can such an 
instrument be a cell phone?  The section-by-section analysis of the bill 
which became ECPA does not shed much additional light on an 
understanding of the provision.  It reaffirms that a “tracking device” is 
“an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of 
movement of a person or object.”309  It also restates that § 3117 “provides 
that if a court is empowered to issue a warrant or other order for the 
                                                 
303 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b).  Note, too, that the § 3117 definition of “tracking device” applies 
only within that section.  Id.  In other words, a “tracking device” as defined for § 3117 
purposes does not necessarily hold the same meaning elsewhere. 
304 Id. § 3117(a) (emphasis added). 
305 Id. (emphasis added). 
306 Does a cell tower qualify as “special tracking equipment?”  One would not think so. 
307 In this statutory instance, the “user” is the one with the radio receiver, not the 
“transmitter.”  A cell phone, of course, transmits and receives.  Cell phone owners, 
subscribers, customers, etc., are generally considered “users” and not third parties 
attempting to determine the users’ whereabouts. 
308 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3564. 
309 Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3588. 
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installation of a mobile tracking device” it may do so regardless of what 
Federal judicial districts the tracked person or object traverses—”even 
outside the jurisdiction of the United States[.]”310  The report adds that 
“[t]his [jurisdictional] clarification does not effect [sic] current legal 
standards for the issuance of such an order.”311  Recall, then, that ECPA 
and § 3117 were enacted in 1986 post-Knotts and post-Karo (which, as 
discussed earlier, held that no court authorization was required to 
electronically track one’s journeys on public thoroughfares), but before 
the 1994 passage of CALEA.   
In short, looking only at § 3117 strongly suggests that a cell phone is 
or qualifies as a tracking device within the meaning of that section.  
Looking at the legislative history, however, leaves one with the 
impression that Congress had little clue about what technology was 
coming down the pike.  As previously discussed, cell phones did not 
start being widely marketed in the U.S. until the mid-1980s so this is not 
necessarily surprising.  Thus, it would appear that at least in this 
instance, the statutory language Congress came up with was drafted in 
such a manner as to preclude being artificially locked in by the state of 
technology as it existed in 1986, i.e., in the face of this chronology the 
statute’s legislative history should not be viewed as determinative.  It 
would appear clear that on the statute’s face, a cell phone easily fits 
within the term “tracking device” and that this language is more direct 
and particularized than the more generalized language found in the 
Pen/Trap Statute and in the SCA, the latter two provisions being laws 
which others contend relate also to tracking devices or processes.   
G. CALEA Does Not Preclude Application of the All Writs Act and Rule 
57(b)   
At its heart, 47 U.S.C. § 1002 is a “capability requirements” provision 
setting a minimum standard or floor that telecommunications carriers 
had to meet in order to, among other things, ensure that law 
enforcement would continue to have lawful access to wire and electronic 
communications in the face of fast-paced technological innovation and 
advancement in telecommunications.  It did not preclude the industry 
from designing its architecture—for its own purposes—to do more than 
the CALEA “floor.”  Indeed, 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1) specifically precluded 
law enforcement from requiring the adoption by industry or prohibiting 
the industry’s implementation of any particular technology.312  In other 
                                                 
310 Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3587-3588. 
311 Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3588. 
312 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1) (2000) states that, 
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words, the government could tell the industry what minimum 
capabilities were required but could not tell it how to achieve those 
minimums.  Thus, when 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) mandates that providers 
must have the capability of “expeditiously isolating and enabling the 
government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to 
access call-identifying information that is reasonably available to the 
carrier,”313 it did not require the government to secure a court order in all 
instances and it did not, in those instances where a court order might be 
necessary or desirable, direct that the order be a warrant, i.e., grounded 
upon probable cause.  If the government, however, wanted access to call-
identifying information for law enforcement purposes314—to the extent it 
would not be revealed in a very general sense by the user’s area 
code315—it must underpin its application for an order (indeed, if an order 
were needed316) with a legal basis either in addition to or other than the 
Pen/Trap Statute.   
H. Does the SCA Fit in Anywhere?   
Because neither the SCA nor the Pen/Trap Statute specifically relates 
to “tracking devices,” “work-arounds” using the pair either singly or as a 
statutory duo is like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.317  As a 
number of the USMJs point out, the SCA does not contemplate yet-to-be-
acquired information:  it is not, temporally speaking, a forward-looking 
                                                                                                             
[t]his subchapter [47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010] does not authorize any law 
enforcement agency or officer—(A) to require any specific design of 
equipment, facilities, services, features, or system configurations to be 
adopted by any provider of a wire or electronic communication 
service, any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, or any 
provider of telecommunications support services; or (B) to prohibit the 
adoption of any equipment, facility, service, or feature by any provider 
of a wire or electronic communication service, any manufacturer of 
telecommunications equipment, or any provider of 
telecommunications support services. 
313 Id. § 1002(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
314 As opposed to concerns relating to emergency fire and medical service.  See, e.g., 47 
C.F.R. § 20.18 (2006). 
315 Now that telephone numbers are “portable,” there is no longer any assurance that the 
user’s area code will even remotely reveal the general geographic area where the user 
makes or receives calls.  For example, someone in Virginia can have and use a Maine area 
code.  See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 52.20-52.33 (2006). 
316 An order might be necessary if third party assistance, although needed, was not 
voluntarily forthcoming. 
317 Congress really needs to step in.  “The use of real time cell site information by law 
enforcement for tracking purposes is a relatively new law enforcement tool and Congress 
has yet to provide specific legislative boundaries on the practice.”  SDIND, No. IP 05-43-
CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181, at *6 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006). 
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statute.  It relates to wire or electronic communication contents in 
storage318 and to “record[s] or other information pertaining to a 
subscriber to or customer of [an electronic communication or remote 
computing service provider] (not including the contents of the 
communications)[.]”319  In order to obtain anything more than 
rudimentary information,320 the government must use either a warrant321 
or a court order,322 the latter being authorized upon a government 
offering of “specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”323   
The statutory definitions applicable to the SCA do not reflect a 
meaning for “records or other information.” 324  “Record” would suggest 
“already existing” data325 which, if one had probable cause, could also be 
secured with a Rule 41 search warrant.  But to what does “other 
information” potentially refer?  Its meaning is certainly not self-apparent 
and could conceivably mean anything other than communication 
contents.  The legislative history illustrates the term with non-exclusive 
examples, “customer lists and payments,”326 which—one could logically 
argue—are not in the same category as cell phone location data.   
I. How Does the Pen/Trap Statute Come into Play?   
We know how the Pen/Trap Statute was worded when it was first 
enacted327 but do we know why its wording was altered from the 
definition as originally signed into law?  By using text italics and 
strikeouts, we can observe how in 2001 the USA PATRIOT Act amended 
the term “pen register” to now be   
                                                 
318 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b) (2000). 
319 Id. § 2703(c). 
320 Id. § 2703(c)(2). 
321 Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A). 
322 Id. § 2703(c)(1)(B). 
323 Id. § 2703(d). 
324 Id. 
325 As opposed to future-occurring location information. 
326 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) 
permits the provider of the service to divulge, in the normal course of 
business, such information as customer lists and payments to anyone 
except a government agency.  It should be noted that the information 
involved is information about the customer’s use of the service not the 
content of the customer’s communications. 
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 38 (1994), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3592. 
327 See supra note 261. 
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a device or process which records or decodes electronic or 
other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or 
otherwise dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information transmitted on the telephone line to which 
such device is attached by an instrument or facility from 
which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, 
provided, however, that such information shall not include the 
contents of any communication, but such term does not 
include any device or process used by a provider or 
customer of a wire or electronic communication service 
for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for 
communications services provided by such provider or 
any device or process used by a provider or customer of a 
wire communication service for cost accounting or other 
like purposes in the ordinary course of its business[.]328   
According to the Congressional Research Service,329 section 216 was 
passed, in part, to,  
 . . . update[ ] the language of the statute to clarify that 
the pen/ register authority applies to modern 
communication technologies.  Current statutory 
references to the target “line,” for example, are revised 
to encompass a “line or other facility.”  Such a facility 
includes:  a cellular telephone number; [and] a specific 
cellular telephone identified by its electronic serial 
number (ESN) . . . .  ”Further, because the pen register or 
trap and trace ‘device’ is often incapable of being 
physically ‘attached; to the target facility due to the 
nature of modern communication technology, [the] 
section . . . makes two other related changes.  First, in 
recognition of the fact that such functions are commonly 
performed today by software instead of physical 
mechanisms, the section allows the pen register or trap 
                                                 
328 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).  This change was effectuated by section 216(c)(2) of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 290 (2001).  Parenthetically note that a trap 
and trace “device,” the conceptual opposite of a pen register, is defined at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3127(4) and was amended by section 216(c)(3) of the USA PATRIOT Act, in much a 
similar manner. 
329 “The Congressional Research Service is the public policy research arm of the United 
States Congress. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS works 
exclusively and directly for Members of Congress, their Committees and staff on a 
confidential, nonpartisan basis.”  Congressional Research Sevice, 
http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/whatscrs. html (last visited Apr. 7, 2007). 
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and trace device to be ‘attached or applied’ to the target 
facility.  Likewise, the definitions of ‘pen register’ and 
‘trap and trace device’ in section 3127 [of Title 18] are 
revised to include an intangible ‘process’ (such as a 
software routine) which collects the same information as a 
physical device.” 330   
It is important to recall that prior to the wireless revolution, the pen 
register was a mechanical instrument—a “physical device”—which was 
never capable of providing the telephone user’s geographic location—
not even roughly or approximately.  The Pen/Trap Statute was amended 
to keep up with changing technology, to ensure that law enforcement 
would have access to the same or similar information—and not 
more331—in the burgeoning wireless environment as it had traditionally 
when wire communications were possible only in a hardline, copper 
wire, tangible instrument environment.   
J. Precision GPS Tracking332   
As noted briefly at the beginning,333 GPS tracking permits greater 
precision (within meters) than is  possible by only knowing which 
towers a cell phone is “hitting” (sometimes no better accuracy than 
within miles).  As also pointed out, this more invasive334 GPS tracking 
was judicially sanctioned in 2005 by a New York Federal District Court, 
                                                 
330 Doyle, supra note 291, at 12-13 (emphasis added). 
331 E.g., location information. 
332  Global Positioning System (GPS), [is a] space-based radio-navigation 
system, consisting of 24 satellites and ground support. GPS provides 
users with accurate information about their position and velocity, as 
well as the time, anywhere in the world and in all weather conditions.  
GPS is available in two basic forms: the standard positioning service 
(SPS) and the precise positioning service (PPS). SPS provides a 
horizontal position that is accurate to about 100 m (about 330 ft); PPS is 
accurate to about 20 m (about 70 ft). For authorized users—normally 
the United States military and its allies—PPS also provides greater 
resistance to jamming and immunity to deceptive signals. 
Microsoft ® Encarta ® Reference Library 2005. 
333 See supra note 1. 
334 I.e., relative to the degree of precision possible with most cell phone location/cell site 
results.  Note that some Nextel phones have GPS capability: “GPS location-based safety 
services like Mobile Locator™, allows you to locate a friend or family member’s phone 
location at anytime, right from your computer. Enjoy audible and visual turn-by-turn 
driving directions to any address, anywhere on Nextel’s Nationwide Network. If you need 
to make a 911 emergency call, the GPS feature can also help emergency personnel locate 
you.”  See Nextel, http://nextelonline.nextel.com/NASApp/onlinestore/en/Action/ 
SubmitRegionAction# drawers (last visited Apr. 7, 2007). 
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United States v. Moran335 using a very uncomplicated Knotts analysis.  In 
the absence of a warrant, a GPS device had been affixed to the 
defendant’s vehicle; thereafter, at trial he moved to suppress all evidence 
derived therefrom.  The court made the facile but now familiar 
observation that “[l]aw enforcement personnel could have conducted a 
visual surveillance of the vehicle as it traveled on the public 
highways.”336  As a consequence, the defendant “had no expectation of 
privacy in the whereabouts of his vehicle on a public roadway.”337  As a 
result, the judge remarked, it should not come as a surprise that “there 
was no search or seizure and no Fourth Amendment implications in the 
use of the GPS device.”338   
If no court order, and certainly not one grounded upon the Fourth 
Amendment, is needed to conduct relatively precise GPS tracking, it 
would therefore stand to reason that no probable cause order would be 
constitutionally required to obtain less accurate cell phone location 
information.   
K. Change to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41   
By order dated April 12, 2006, the Supreme Court amended a 
number of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including Rule 41, 
which became effective on December 1, 2006.339  These rule changes, 
accompanied by excerpted notes from the Judicial Conference of the 
United States,340 were transmitted on April 12, 2006 by the Chief Justice 
to both the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of 
the Senate.   
Helpfully, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure annotated the new changes with 
explanatory text which summarizes the changes to Rule 41.  In sum, in 
those instances where a tracking device would implicate a Fourth 
Amendment “reasonable expectation” of privacy interest (such as 
                                                 
335 349 F. Supp. 2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). 
336 Id. at 467. 
337 Id. 
338 Id. 
339 Note that 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he Supreme Court 
shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in 
the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges 
thereof)[.]” 
340 See Adminisrative Office of the U.S. Court, Fed. R. Crim. P., Amend. Crim. R., Apr. 12, 
2006, available at WL 2006 US Order 21; see also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (describing the judicial 
conference). 
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performing a hard-wire installation of a tracking device inside a vehicle 
trunk or monitoring the whereabouts of a motor vehicle located inside 
the garage of a private residence), an applicant—assuming there is 
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause341—may seek a Rule 41 
tracking device warrant which permits monitoring for up to forty-five 
days after installation.342  An unlimited number of extensions for up to 45 
days each are permitted for “good cause” shown.  The explanatory text 
makes clear that the new changes to Rule 41 are not meant to expand or 
contract the meaning of the term “tracking device” as set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3117(b).343  Installation must occur within ten calendar days (and 
during the daytime unless “good cause” to the contrary is shown) after 
the warrant is signed by the magistrate judge.  Although installation of 
the “device” is to occur within the federal judicial district where the 
magistrate judge sits, the person or object being tracked may be 
monitored regardless of district.   
Within ten calendar days after the tracking has been completed, the 
warrant’s return must be made to the magistrate judge designated in the 
warrant.  “The officer executing a tracking-device warrant must enter on 
it the exact date and time the device was installed and the period during 
which it was used.”344  A copy of the warrant, which serves as notice that 
the tracking has occurred, is to be provided to “the person who was 
tracked or whose property was tracked.”345   
Service may be accomplished by delivering a copy to the 
person who, or whose property, was tracked; or by 
leaving a copy at the person’s residence or usual place of 
abode with an individual of suitable age and discretion 
who resides at that location and by mailing a copy to the 
person’s last known address.346   
                                                 
341 If probable cause is demonstrated, the magistrate judge “must” issue the search 
warrant.  This is unaltered from the version of Rule 41(d)(1) in effect prior to the change.  
Importantly, the explanatory text says that the Rule 41 modification does not “hold that 
such [tracking device] warrants may issue only on a showing of probable cause.  Instead, it 
simply provides that if probable cause is shown, the magistrate judge must issue the 
warrant.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 Advisory Comm. Nts. on the 2006 Amendments. 
342 Any order would permit installation, needed maintenance/repair, monitoring, and 
any needed removal. 
343 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2000): “‘[T]racking device’ means an electronic or mechanical 
device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.” 
344 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2)(A). 
345 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2)(C). 
346 Id. 
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Such notice will, of course, probably compromise the investigation and 
thus it may be delayed “if the delay is authorized by statute,”347 which, 
in this case, would be a reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3101(a).  Section 3103(a), 
in turn, permits such a delay if the court finds “reasonable cause” to 
believe notice would otherwise occasion an “adverse result” (as defined 
at 18 U.S.C. § 2705).348  The explanatory text also says that a delay “might 
be appropriate, for example, where the owner of the tracked property is 
undetermined . . . .” 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although the success rate of DOJ’s hybrid theory in support of cell 
site location information applications has been less than impressive, the 
only thing that is truly clear is that the state of the law is unclear.  As of 
this writing,349 only one of the USMJ cell site location opinions 
summarized above has been reviewed by a U.S. District Court Judge, nor 
does there appear to be any similar case (except Forest350) authored by 
higher judicial authority.  This is bound to change, however, and readers 
should be alert as the law in this area continues to emerge. 
                                                 
347 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(3). 
348 Incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2), an “adverse result” would  thus be defined as, (a) 
endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; (b) flight from prosecution; (c) 
destruction or tampering with evidence; (d) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (e) 
otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation. 
349 November 6, 2006. 
350 United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 856 (2004). 
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